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In our daily life, we often experience moral outrage when we hear news about 
perpetrators who treated others unfairly even if we are not the victim. We also think that 
perpetrators should receive punishment they deserve. In fact, research shows that adults are often 
willing to pay a cost to intervene against such fairness norm violations even when they are an 
uninvolved third party. This so-called third-party punishment is striking because it cannot be 
easily explained by self-interested motivations. If people were rational agents who try to 
maximize their own payoffs, they would not pay any costs to intervene in third-party 
transgressions. Thus, third-party punishment has often been considered as an index of one’s 
sense of fairness. However, despite its theoretical importance, in the field of developmental 
psychology, its underlying mechanisms and developmental trajectories have been relatively 
understudied. This dissertation includes four sets of studies to assess following questions: (a) 
When do children start to engage in and reason about third-party punishment? (b) What 
motivates third-party punishment in children? 
To answer the first question, by testing a wide age range (age 5 to 9), I found that with 
age, children’s punishment becomes increasingly selective (Study 1 & 2). That is, over 
development, children are less likely to punish fair allocations, while they become more likely to 
punish unfair allocations. Further, from age 7, children start to think of third-party punishment as 
a way to reduce inequality between two other individuals (Study 4). To answer the second 
question, I examined the influences of children’s own experience (Study 2) and the possibility of 
 viii 
future interactions (Study 3) on third-party punishment, respectively. I found that neither 
robustly influenced third-party punishment in children. Rather, children enact third-party 
punishment in a way that could restore equality between two other people (Study 1), suggesting 
that their punishment is motivated by fairness concerns. However, despite children’s use of 
punishment to rectify inequality, I found that children prefer third-party helpers over third-party 
punishers (Study 4), which questions the extent to which children endorse third-party 
punishment as an appropriate intervention against unfairness.  
Taken together, four sets of studies suggest that third-party punishment in children 
reflects their fairness concern. This dissertation elucidates the development and motivations of 
third-party punishment in children. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Cooperation is an important feature of human social groups. While humans show 
extraordinary abilities to cooperate, there is often a tension between an individual’s interests and 
those of other social partners. Fairness norms serve as a guide on how to resolve this tension, 
providing standards of behavior that can foster cooperation and help prevent individuals from 
undermining social relationships. However, the mere existence of fairness norms is not 
sufficient, as individuals might follow them imperfectly or not at all. Therefore, both theoretical 
models and empirical research highlight how different forms of intervention against those who 
violate fairness norms are important. Specifically, in direct interactions, individuals might 
retaliate against those who treat them unfairly or shun them to avoid further exploitation (Balliet, 
Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a). 
Moreover, in group contexts, individuals might punish free-riders who contribute less to a public 
good than others, a mechanism that maintains a higher level of cooperation in the face of 
defection (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gurerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006). These findings 
suggest that people enact punishment when cooperative norms are violated.  
Importantly, people punish those who violate fairness norms not only when their interest 
is at stake but also when they are an uninvolved observer. For example, studies show that adults 
punish unfair resource dividers even in situations where they are a third-party who is not directly 
affected by the unfair allocations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Henrich et al., 2006; Krasnow, 
Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Yamagishi et al., 2017). More 
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strikingly, adults are willing to pay a personal cost in such third-party situations by e.g. paying 
their own money to inflict costs on a perpetrator. This phenomenon is called costly third-party 
punishment (TPP) and is well-established in adults. 
The underlying motivations for this so-called third-party punishment remains hotly 
debated. One theory suggests that punishment of unfair sharing is an index of one’s altruistic 
tendencies and concern for group norms (e.g., Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). Whereas, other theorists suggest that the 
underlying motivation for punishment is ultimately self-interested (Krasnow et al., 2016; 
Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2010) or spiteful (Yamagishi et al., 2012, 2017). 
Importantly, despite disagreements over what exactly are the underlying motives, costly 
punishment has been identified as an important phenomenon in the study of human cooperation 
because it addresses the issue of how to respond to acts of free-riding (Balliet et al., 2011; Boyd, 
Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gurerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 
2006). In fact, TPP has often been claimed to reflect one’s concern for fairness norms because a 
third-party pays a personal cost to punish the perpetrator with no immediate benefits (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b, but see Raihani & Bshary, 2019 for a review of a 
different view).  
Empirical Evidence About Third-Party Punishment in Children 
TPP marks a developmental milestone in fairness development in that children have to 
overcome their self-interest and apply the fairness norms even when their interest is not at stake 
(McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017). As young children tend to have a self-serving 
bias in resource allocations, it is important to understand when and how children’s genuine 
concern for fairness norms emerges. For example, in one study (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013), 
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children as young as 3 years old report that they should share resources equally with others, 
acknowledging the fairness norms. However, it is not until age 7 to 8 that children share 
resources equally, suggesting a discrepancy between their understanding of fairness norms and 
behavioral adherence to these norms. Similarly, 8-year-olds, but not 4- to 7-year-olds, avoid not 
only receiving fewer resources than a partner but also receiving more resources than the partner 
(Blake & McAuliffe, 2011), implying that it is not until age 8 that children apply fairness norms 
when their payoff is at an advantage. Therefore, TPP could be a critical test case for the 
emergence of fairness concerns both across phylogeny and ontogeny because children have to 
incur a personal cost to punish unfair allocations when there are no immediate benefits to the self 
(McAuliffe et al., 2017).  
Developmental studies have begun to trace the developmental trajectory of TPP in 
children. Two studies using looking-time measures have found that infants expect a differential 
treatment of prosocial and antisocial agents. For example, 10-month-olds look longer at an event 
in which an unfair resource divider receives punishment than an event in which a fair resource 
divider receives punishment (Meristo & Surian, 2014) and 13- to 15-month-old infants 
differentially associate verbal praise and admonishment with fair and unfair resource dividers 
(Deschamps, Eason, & Sommerville, 2015). While these studies explore infants’ event 
representations and how they anticipate others would act towards fair or unfair behavior, they do 
not speak to infants’ evaluations of these behaviors or their own third-party intervention.  
Several studies have shown that a precursor of TPP can be found in children aged 2 to 3 
years of age. For example, 2-year-olds take treats away more often from an agent who previously 
hindered another agent than from a helpful agent (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). 
Furthermore, 3-year-olds protest verbally against a person who destroyed another person’s 
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belonging (Vaish, Missana & Tomasello, 2011). Children around this age also punish the 
destroyer by taking his or her opportunity to engage in a fun, desirable activity (Yudkin, Van 
Bavel, & Rhodes, 2020). Overall, these studies reveal that by 3 years of age, children actively 
intervene against moral transgressions in some contexts, even if they are an unaffected third-
party observer. While these studies examine interventions against certain forms of antisocial 
behavior, such as hindering of another agent’s instrumental goal (Hamlin et al., 2011) or damage 
to one’s property (Vaish et al., 2011; Yudkin et al., 2020), these prior studies did not assess how 
children react to a situation in which fairness norms are violated. 
Children’s TPP against unfairness has been found in children aged 6 and older 
(Gummerum & Chu, 2014 with samples from the UK; House et al., 2020 with samples in 
Argentina, India, Germany and the US; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; McAuliffe, 
Jordan, & Warneken, 2015 with samples in the US). Studies have shown that when in the role of 
a third party, 6- to 8-year-olds are willing to pay a cost to prevent inequality (Gummerum & 
Chu, 2014; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015). 
Specifically, in McAuliffe et al. (2015), children intervened selectively when dividers made 
unequal, selfish offers to a recipient (and did not intervene when the divider split resources 
equally with the recipient). This study found that this pattern emerges robustly by 6 years of age, 
with 5-year-olds already trending in the same direction but not yet reliably punishing unfairness. 
The studies illustrated above measured children’s costly punishment as a binary option 
(punish or not). By contrast, Smith and Warneken (2016) asked children to judge the amount of 
rewards or punishment hypothetical actors should receive for doing more or less of a good deed 
(e.g. cleaning windows) or bad deed (e.g. muddy footprints on the carpet). They found that 6- to 
10-year-old children, but not 4- to 5-year-olds, assigned more aversive jobs to those who showed 
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more blameworthy behaviors. Thus, as they grow older, children allocate punishment in 
proportion to the amount of blameworthy behaviors, suggesting the development of desert-based 
punishment. 
In sum, existing research shows that in situations involving helping or hindering one’s 
instrumental goal, 2-year-olds already direct reward and punishment towards agents based on 
desert (Hamlin et al., 2011). By 3 years of age, children intervene against moral transgressions 
by reproaching verbally (Vaish et al., 2011) or by preventing access to activities after a property 
damage (Yudkin et al., 2020). Around 6 years, children systematically intervene against fairness 
norm violations, punishing unfair allocations more often than fair allocations (McAuliffe et al., 
2015) and endorsing relatively more punishment to more severe norm violations (Smith & 
Warneken, 2016). Therefore, as children grow older, they not only intervene against an 
increasing range of transgressions — from goal hindrance, ownership violations to fairness 
violations — but also intervene in a systematic and selective manner. 
Evaluations of Third-Party Punishers in Children 
While the studies illustrated above show when children start to engage in punishment at a 
behavioral level, their understanding of punishment could emerge earlier than behavioral 
enactment of punishment. Previous research assessed infants’ understanding and evaluations of a 
third-party punisher. For example, in an interaction involving physical aggression (e.g., a 
perpetrator chasing and hitting the victim), 6-month-old infants were more likely to touch a 
third-party agent who intervened by blocking the perpetrator from the victim over another third-
party who did not intervene, demonstrating a preference for intervenors (Kanakogi et al., 2017). 
Another study (Hamlin et al., 2011) tested infants’ preferences in a context that involves helping 
or hindering one’s goal. When infants had to choose between a taker-puppet who had removed a 
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treat from a goal-hinderer and a giver who had handed a treat to the goal-hinderer, 8-month-olds, 
but not 5-month-olds, preferred the taker over the giver, suggesting that they like those who 
punish hinderers better than those who help hinderers.  
In Vaish, Herrmann, Markmann and Tomasello (2016), 4- and 5-year-olds watched 
scenarios in which a transgressor broke a moral norm (e.g., one person destroying another 
person’s belongings). Subsequently, one third-party enforced the norm verbally (e.g., “Don’t 
ever do that again”), whereas the other third-party made neutral comments. Results showed that 
5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, evaluated norm-enforcers more positively than non-enforcers. 
Hence, in a context of ownership violations, children’s own spontaneous verbal protest emerges 
around 3 years (Vaish et al., 2011), whereas it is not until 5 years of age that children reflect on 
the behaviors of a third party and like those who verbally enforce norms more than those who do 
not. Taken together, the studies with infants and children suggest their preference for punishers 
over non-punishers in various forms of moral transgression. 
These studies provide insight into children’s evaluation of third-party punishers. 
However, what is not known is whether children choose punishers because they like them or 
merely because they are paired with more negatively valenced individuals. Specifically, 
punishers have been compared with bystanders who witnessed the transgression but chose not to 
intervene (e.g., Kanakogi et al., 2017, Vaish et al., 2016) or with givers who helped the 
transgressor (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2011). It is therefore not clear whether they evaluate punishers 
positively or just not as negatively as the alternative agent.  
Moreover, prior research focused exclusively on moral transgressions such as hindering 
one’s goal (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2011), physical aggression (e.g., Kanakogi et al., 2017) and 
property damage (e.g., Vaish et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2016). Equally important to consider is 
 7 
how children evaluate the punishment of transgressors when fairness norms are violated. As 
illustrated earlier, third-party punishment is an important mechanism for dealing with individuals 
who violate fairness norms. In this dissertation, I tested children from 5 to 9 years of age because 
this is the age range when children show significant development in their understanding of 
fairness norms. For instance, around 6 years of age, children enact punishment against those who 
violated fairness norms (McAuliffe et al., 2015). Between 7 and 8 years, children reject offers 
advantageous to themselves (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011), suggesting that children start to apply 
fairness norms in an impartial way.  
Research Questions and Proposed Research 
In this dissertation, I aim to answer three key research questions. First, when and how 
does third-party punishment emerges in childhood? Second, what motivates children to punish 
unfairness and what are the conditions under which punishment increases or decreases? Third, 
how does children’s reasoning about punishment interact with an alternative form of intervention 
such as third-party helping? Ultimately, the focus on TPP would allow us to consider questions 
such as: what are the antecedents and consequences of third-party punishment in children? 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the proposed research. 
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I propose four sets of studies to address these questions (see Figure 1). Study 1 
investigates the distributional aim of third-party punishment in children. Specifically, this study 
tested whether children use third-party punishment to restore equality between two other 
individuals.  
Study 2 encompasses two studies that examine whether children’s experience as a 
second-party recipient (i.e., whether they received fair or unfair allocations) affects their 
subsequent third-party punishment.  
Study 3 assesses whether the possibility of encountering the same divider in the future 
interactions would affect children’s subsequent third-party punishment. Specifically, I tested 
whether children are more likely to punish unfair dividers when they are told that the same 
divider (vs. a new divider) will share resources with child themselves.  
Study 4 investigates children’s evaluations of third-party punishers. By comparing third-
party punishers with third-party helpers, I aim to determine the extent to which third-party 




Chapter 2: Study 1 
Third-party Punishment in Children Aims at Equality 
 
Abstract 
Third-party punishment has been regarded as an important mechanism to promote fairness. 
While previous research has shown that children aged 6 and older punish unfair behaviors at a 
personal cost, it is unknown whether they actually intend to establish equality or whether 
equality is a mere byproduct of punishment. In this pre-registered study, N = 60 5-to-9-year-olds 
witnessed how an agent made unfair resource allocations to a peer. Children could then pay a 
personal cost to intervene and decide not only whether to punish, but also how much to punish. I 
found that with age, children calibrate the degree of punishment to equalize outcomes between 
third parties. 
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Third-party punishment in children aims at equality 
Children’s TPP against unfairness has been found in children aged 6 and older 
(Gummerum & Chu, 2014 with samples from the UK; House et al., 2020 with samples in 
Argentina, India, Germany and the US; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; McAuliffe, 
Jordan, & Warneken, 2015 with samples in the US). For example, in McAuliffe et al. (2015), 
children were shown how an absent child (hereafter divider) allocated 6 Skittles between the self 
and another absent child (hereafter recipient). The divider made either fair (3 for the self, 3 for 
the recipient) or unfair allocations (6 for the self, 0 for the recipient). As a third-party observer, 
children could accept the allocation, which meant that the Skittles were distributed the way the 
divider had allocated them, at no cost to the participant. The alternative was for the participant to 
pay one of their own Skittles to reject the divider’s allocation. Then, all 6 Skittles were thrown 
away and became inaccessible to everyone. Therefore, rejection serves as a third-party 
punishment, resulting in a 0:0 outcome for the divider and the recipient. McAuliffe et al. (2015) 
found that 6-year-olds rejected unfair allocations more often than fair allocations. Whereas, 5-
year-olds showed a similar, but less reliable pattern of punishment. This study suggests that TPP 
against unfairness develops around age 6. 
Although these earlier studies provide insight into the development of TPP, one critical 
question remains. In previous studies, children’s punishment was binary (e.g., House et al., 2020; 
Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et al., 2015). For example, children could stay with the divider's 
original allocation by accepting it or remove everything (0:0) by rejecting it. Consequently, 
punishment automatically resulted in equality between two individuals (0:0). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether children genuinely aimed for equality when they chose to punish or equality was 
a byproduct of their punishment decisions. For example, it is possible that children punish selfish 
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dividers to see the person suffer or to avenge the victim without an intention to restore equality. 
If this was the case, the equality that resulted from punishment was not the main intention, but 
only a side-effect of the child’s goal to punish. 
Here I examine whether children punish with the aim to create equality. I start with the 
notion that at least in adults, TPP has been identified as a potential mechanism to enforce norms, 
including fairness norms. Therefore, if children’s TPP is motivated by a norm of equality, 
children should punish in a way that reduces inequality among third parties. Alternatively, if 
their TPP is driven by a self-centered motive such as spite, competition (Fehr, Hoff, & 
Kshetramade, 2008; Raihani & Bshary, 2019) or a desire to watch the deserved punishment 
enacted (Mendes et al., 2018), the focus would be on inflicting costs on others, without 
consideration on whether punishment reduces inequality. To date, whether children use TPP to 
endorse the fairness norm has not been measured directly. The current study is a test of 
children’s norm-based punishment by assessing the distributional end state their punishment 
pursues.   
To examine whether children punish with the goal of creating equality, I presented 
participants with three (pre-programmed) allocations between two peers that were represented as 
two avatars on a computer screen: fair allocations (2:2), mildly unfair allocations (3:1) and 
extremely unfair allocations (4:0). Critically, our participants were in the role of a third-party and 
were free to choose how many coins they wanted to take away from which individual and 
therefore decided not only whether to punish, but also on the degree of punishment. 
 I tested the hypothesis that children use punishment to establish equality against several 
other possible outcomes. Specifically, based on findings that by school-age, children from the 
US gravitate towards equal sharing of rewards (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012), 
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I predicted that between 7 and 8 years of age, children would become more likely to fine-tune 
their punishment to balance the scales between two third parties (e.g., turning 3:1 into 1:1). 
However, several alternative outcomes are plausible. For example, children might punish unfair 
allocations more often than fair allocations, but not yet be able to calibrate their punishment to 
restore equality (e.g., making 3:1 into 2:1). Another possibility is that children might be 
motivated to avenge the recipient by over-punishing the selfish divider (e.g., making 3:1 into 
0:1) without considering how their punishment tilts the scales in the opposite direction. Another 
possibility is that children punish to deprive others of rewards with the competitive goal to end 
up with more resources than others. If this is the case, children should punish fair as well as 
unfair allocations, and should take all coins away from the recipient as well as the divider (e.g., 
making 3:1 into 0:0). Our study was designed to assess these different possibilities. 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 60 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 88.47 months, 
range = 61 - 119 months, n = 12 in each age group, 30 male, 30 female). Children were tested at 
a museum in the Midwest of the US. Demographic information such as race, education and 
income could not be obtained as per the rules of the museum. Four additional children were 
excluded because of failure to correctly answer at least one of the comprehension checks (2), 
parental interference (1), or parental report of their child having autism (1). Power analyses 
established that our sample size was large enough to detect effects of interest. 
Experimental design and procedure.  After parents gave written consent, children sat at 
a table with the study apparatus while the parents watched passively from a few steps away. A 
female experimenter introduced the computer game referred to as the “coin game” and explained 
that players could collect virtual coins to later exchange for prizes. During a prize introduction, 
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children learned that the more coins they have during the coin game, the more and the better 
prizes they would be able to choose afterwards. 
In the subsequent practice phase, the experimenter introduced the two other players in 
the game by stating that they were children of the same age and gender at another museum, who 
are currently connected online. In reality, the decisions of the two other players were computer-
programmed. The experimenter introduced the role of the divider and the recipient: The divider 
could decide how to divide 4 coins between the self and the recipient. The divider could make 
one of three allocations: (a) 2 for the self and 2 for the recipient, (b) 3 for the self and 1 for the 
recipient and (c) 4 for the self and 0 for the recipient. The recipient was a passive player who 
could only accept the divider’s allocation.  
 
Figure 2. Computer screen display of the coin game during the test phase in Study 1. 
 
This example shows a 3:1 allocation made by the divider (Pearl on the top left corner) to 
the recipient (Callie on the top right corner). Children as a third-party observer at the bottom 
could push either their own coin above the black basket (rejection) or the gray button 
(acceptance).  
 
After introducing the roles, children watched on the screen how the divider produced 
different allocations and practiced their role as a third-party punisher. After the divider made an 
allocation, children could press either the gray button or their own coin above their basket 
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(Figure 2). If they pushed the gray button (acceptance), the four coins went into each player’s 
basket just the way the divider allocated the coins, and the child’s own coin went back into their 
own basket. That is, acceptances incurred no cost to the child.  
Alternatively, if children pushed their own coin above their own basket (rejection), they 
could decide which other coins they wanted to take away from either the divider or the recipient 
or both players. When children pushed a coin, a vacuum appeared at the top of the screen and 
sucked up the coin, such that no one could keep the coin. Any remaining coins on the screen that 
children choose not to take away from players went into each player’s basket. Therefore, in our 
game, children could be flexible about who to punish (divider, recipient or both) and the number 
of coins they want to take away (up to 4 coins), including taking all coins away from the other 
players. Critically, for children to punish others, they first had to sacrifice their own coin, making 
punishment costly for them. 
There were four practice trials in total. Children practiced four possible outcomes of each 
button (accept vs. reject) in each allocation (fair vs. unfair). The experimenter asked 
comprehension checks about the consequence of each button and whether each button required 
the payment of the child participant’s coin or not. If the child answered incorrectly, the 
experimenter corrected the answer and asked the question(s) again in the next practice trial. All 
60 children included in the data analysis passed these comprehension checks.  
After the four practice trials, to make children believe that the other players were real, the 
experimenter pretended to call the other players on speakerphone and checked if they were ready 
to play the game. In reality, a confederate answered the phone call. Upon the completion of the 
study, the experimenter left and a secondary experimenter asked children whether they thought 
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the players were real or pretend. I found that 78% of children (47 out of 60) said the players were 
real. 
During the subsequent test phase, children played 6 rounds as a third-party observer in 
total. Children received 20 coins as their initial endowment (coins that dropped into their basket 
on the screen). The divider and recipient were different from those in the practice trials (with 
different names). Each child played 2 rounds of 2:2 allocations, 2 rounds of 3:1 allocations and 2 
rounds of 4:0 allocations, presented in a pseudo-random order with the restriction that two 
identical allocations were not presented consecutively. In each round, children could press one of 
two buttons (gray or their own coin) to either accept or reject the divider’s allocation towards the 
recipient. The role of each player remained the same throughout the test trials. 
After the test phase, to assess whether children’s numeric understanding affected their 
performances in the coin game, I administered a non-social numeric task. Children saw four blue 
triangles on the computer screen that were identical to the three allocations in the coin game and 
were asked to make both sides equal. Children were able to create equal numbers of triangles in 
96% of the trials. Thus, any potential age-related sensitivity to equality in the coin game cannot 
be attributed to their numeric inability to make both sides equal. 
I counterbalanced the order of test trials, practice trials, deception check questions, 
numerical task trials, the other player’s identity, and the type of unfair allocation during practice. 
Data coding and analyses. Children’s responses were automatically recorded by 
GameMaker Studio (https://www.yoyogames.com) and later checked and entered into a 
spreadsheet by independent coders. All statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical 
software (R version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 2018).  
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I pre-registered our hypotheses and analyses before data collection 
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=3iu8ci). All data and protocols are available through the 
Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/3v8zw/?view_only=778850243242493dae24099b8d9e58e7 
I analyzed the difference in the number of coins between the divider and recipient with a 
linear regression, and rejection rate and the rate of creating equality with Generalized Linear 
Mixed Models (GLMM). I compared a full GLMM, which included age in months and allocation 
and an interaction between age and allocation as fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect 
with a null model, which included only subject ID as a random intercept. If the full model 
provided a significantly better fit to the data, I created a minimal model by sequentially dropping 
single terms from the full model, and finalized our minimal model when dropping single terms 
no longer provided a better fit to the data. 
Results 
When do children punish? I first assessed whether children’s decision to punish was 
influenced by age and allocation. A full GLMM on children’s rejection (0 = acceptance, 1 = 
rejection) provided a significantly better fit to the data than the null model (LRT, χ2 (5) = 36.11, 
p < .001), further revealing a significant interaction between allocation and age (LRT, χ2 (2) = 
22.46, p < .001).  
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Figure 3. Children’s punishment decisions in Study 1.  
(A) Estimates of children’s rejection rate with 95% confidence intervals based on the final 
model. (B) Estimates of the mean difference in one trial with 95% confidence intervals based on 
the linear regression. In the Y axis, 2 indicates that, on average, the divider had 2 more coins 
than the recipient in a trial after children’s intervention. (C) Estimates of the rate of creating 
equality with 95% confidence intervals based on the final model. 
 
As shown in Figure 3A, estimates for children’s rejection rate of unfair allocations 
increased with age from around 20% of trials at age 5 to over 70% of trials by age 9 (LRT, χ2 (1) 
= 9.20, b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, p < .01 for 3:1 and χ2 (1) = 13.15, b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, p < .001 for 
4:0), whereas rejection of fair allocations remained low at around 20% of trials overall (and even 
tended to slightly decrease with age; LRT, χ2 (1) = 3.32, b = -0.03, SE = 0.02, p = .07). In fact, 
pairwise comparisons showed that the trajectories of responding to unfair allocations differ both 
between 3:1 and 2:2 (b = 0.07, SE = 0.02, p < .001) and 4:0 and 2:2 (b = 0.07, SE = 0.02, p < 
.001), but not from each other (4:0 vs. 3:1, b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, p > .62). In sum, with age, 
children became more likely to reject unfair over fair allocations and rejected allocations of 3:1 
and 4:0 at similar rates. These results are consistent with the previous work (McAuliffe et al., 
2015) that with age, children are more likely to punish unfair over fair allocations. 
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Do children punish to reduce inequality? To assess our main question about children’s 
degree of punishment, I first examined whether children were more likely to reduce inequality 
through punishment with age. To assess this, I measured the difference in the number of coins 
between two players at the end of each trial and averaged it across all trials, resulting in one 
mean difference score per child, with higher values indicating greater inequality while a score of 
zero indicating perfect equality. 
Estimates of the mean difference in the number of coins between two players declined 
from 1.75 coins at age 5 to 0.62 coins at age 10. Our analyses showed that with age (b = -0.02, 
SE = 0.003), the difference in the number of coins between the divider and the recipient 
decreased after children’s intervention, R2 = .26, F(1, 58) = 22.08, p < .001 (Figure 3B). Hence, 
as children grow older, they use punishment as a way to minimize inequality between 
individuals. 
How often do children create exact equality? The result from the mean difference 
showed that the outcome of children’s punishment gets closer to equality with age. Additionally, 
I examined the rate at which children used punishment to establish perfect equality such that 
both players ended up with the exact same number of coins. This analysis using success or 
failure at reaching exact equality as a binary variable is stricter because it tests whether 
punishment perfectly hits the target outcome (equality).  
A full GLMM on children’s creation of perfect equality between two other players (0 = 
inequality, 1 = equality) provided a better fit to the data than the null model (LRT, χ2 (5) = 
183.39, p < .001). I found significant main effects of allocation (LRT, χ2 (2) = 163.51, p < .001) 
and age (LRT, χ2 (1) = 19.31, p < .001), but no interaction between age and allocation (LRT, χ2 
(2) = 2.92, p > .23). Pairwise comparisons from the main effect of allocation revealed that exact 
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equality occurred more often after fair allocations (M = 0.93, SD = 0.26) than in unfair 
allocations (b = -4.29, SE = 0.52, p < .001 for 2:2 vs. 3:1; b = -3.99, SE = 0.51, p < .001 for 2:2 
vs. 4:0), which is not surprising given that equality already existed in fair allocations.  
More importantly, I found a main effect of age, suggesting that across allocations, 
children were more likely to establish exact equality with age (b = 0.05, SE = 0.01, p < .001). As 
can be seen in Figure 3C, estimated rates of establishing perfect equality in unfair allocations 
increased from below 10% of trials at age 5 to over 50% of the trials at age 10. These rates of 
creating equality did not differ from each other between 3:1 (M = 0.26, SD = 0.44) and 4:0 
allocations (M = 0.31, SD = 0.46; b = 0.30, SE = 0.32, p > .34). This analysis provides 
converging evidence that with age, children become more likely to create equality between third 
parties. 
How many coins do children take away in each allocation? Our final question was 
how many coins children took away from which individual when they decided to punish. To 
assess this, I calculated the average number of coins taken away from each player in the 141 
trials (39% of test trials) in which children chose to reject the allocation (Figure 4). In terms of 
the number of coins children took away from the divider, they took 3.54 out of 4 coins in 4:0 
allocations, 2.25 out of 3 coins in 3:1 allocations, and 1.54 out of 2 coins in 2:2 allocations. In 
terms of the number of coins children took away from the recipient, in 3:1 allocations, 5-year-
olds took 0.80 out of 1 coin. However, children tended to take less coins away from the recipient 
with age: 9-year-olds took 0.07 coins away from the recipient. In 2:2 allocations, children took 
1.68 out of 2 coins away.  
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Figure 4. Number of coins taken away from players in Study 1. 
(A) Average number of coins taken away from the divider in each age group. (B) Average 
number of coins taken away from the recipient in each age group. The size of circles represents 
the frequency of rejection. In Figure 4B, 4:0 allocations are not included because in these trials 
the recipient had no coins that could be taken away. 
 
Overall, when children rejected unfair allocations, they took coins from the divider in a 
way that established equality and were less likely to take coins from the recipient with age. 
When children rejected fair allocations in a minority of trials, they took coins away from the 
recipient as well as the divider. 
Discussion of Study 1 
Our findings demonstrate the development of fairness norm-based punishment in which 
children use punishment to create equality. This was possible because in our task, children were 
able to express their distributional preference by deciding not only whether to punish, but how 
much to punish. I showed that with age, (a) children were willing to pay a cost so that 
punishment would reduce inequality between individuals, and (b) they became increasingly 
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better at creating exact equality. These findings support our hypothesis that with age, children 
fine-tune their punishment to restore equality.  
Our findings rule out several alternative hypotheses of what could have motivated 
children’s punishment. If children’s punishment had been primarily driven by self-centered 
motives such as competition or inflicting costs on others, they would not have cared about 
creating equal outcomes between two other individuals. For instance, if they had been motivated 
to win against others, children should have taken all coins from not only the divider but the 
recipient in 3:1 allocations. However, this was not the case: 9-year-olds took about 2 coins from 
the divider and almost 0 coins from the recipient, suggesting that their punishment targeted 
specifically at the selfish divider. Similarly, if children had been concerned exclusively about 
avenging the victim, their punishment would have ended up in another unequal outcome that 
favors the victim over the divider (e.g., making 3:1 into 0:1), which was not the case. Overall, 
our findings show that children’s costly punishment is motivated by a concern for fairness, with 
children becoming increasingly more likely to use punishment to create equality between two 
individuals.  
Our results show important age effects. Children at age 5 punished fair allocations at a 
similar rate as unfair allocations. However, with age, children’s tendency to punish fair 
allocations declined, while their willingness to punish unfair allocations increased. Nonetheless, 
even though 9-year-olds as the oldest tested age group were most likely to create equality, they 
were far from perfect (establishing perfect equality in 46% of 3:1 allocations and 54% of 4:0 
allocations). One major reason is that they did not always punish unfair allocations, perhaps 
because punishment was costly for them and they were hesitant to always punish even though 
they were capable of establishing equality.  
 22 
These results add to the existing literature that children around age 8 and older give up 
their own resources to avoid getting more than others, which suggested that children are averse 
to inequality even when it is advantageous to themselves (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & 
Olson, 2012). Furthermore, our findings are consistent with a recent study that children’s 
punishment targets unequal outcomes regardless of the divider's intention behind the outcome 
(Bernhard, Martin, & Warneken, in press). Together, children’s focus on unequal outcomes 
implies that the egalitarian motive to reduce differences in payoffs among people could underlie 
children’s punishment, as had been previously shown with adults (Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Johnson et al., 2009). Importantly, our study shows that children calibrate the 
amount of punishment not only to prevent unequal outcomes, but specifically to create 
allocations that move others closer to equality. 
Although children showed an increased sensitivity to equality with age, there were 
noteworthy patterns observed in young children. For example, 5-year-olds were more likely than 
older children to take coins away from the disadvantaged recipient (Figure 4). However, the lack 
of equality restoration in young children cannot be attributed to their lack of numerical 
understanding because children were able to make both sides equal in our non-social numeric 
task. Also, our findings do not necessarily imply that 5-year-olds lack a sense of fairness per se. 
For example, in contexts in which there was no cost to the self, infants and young children 
demonstrate a preference for equal over unequal allocations (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Fehr et al., 
2008; Geraci & Surian, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). Instead, I speculate that 5-
year-olds were in the process of learning when and how much to punish in a context that 
involves a cost to the self.    
 23 
One potential concern is that the use of a computer game limited children’s 
comprehension of the social interaction. That is, the advantage of allowing for better 
experimental control and anonymity in a computer game with actual costs to the child might be 
offset by having to simulate a social interaction. To address this concern, the task was designed 
to be highly engaging for children and included comprehension checks showing that children had 
no difficulty following the game. However, while the vast majority affirmed our manipulation 
check that they interacted with real children, 13 out of 60 did not. To address this, I confirmed 
that the patterns of results were the same when these children were excluded from analyses, 
suggesting that they did not bias our findings. Another concern is that because children 
interacted with the same divider and recipient throughout, they might not have focused on 
individual allocations but the whole sequence of events. However, supplementary analyses 
indicated that there were no effects involving trial number or children’s rejection in a previous 
trial. 
One question for future research is why older children showed equality-oriented TPP. It is 
possible that this reflects a genuine sense of fairness that emerges at this age. However, it is also 
possible that this is in part influenced by older children wanting to signal how much they care for 
fairness. It is known that children from age 8 show a clear sign of reputation management 
(Engelmann & Rapp, 2018). Therefore, reputational concerns might partly influence equality-
oriented TPP in children aged 8 and older. Future research should examine potential motivations 
underlying TPP in children.   
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Chapter 3: Study 2 




Third-party punishment is an important mechanism to enforce norm-following. Previous 
research has shown that by around 6 years of age, children begin to punish individuals who 
violate fairness norms, even when they are an unaffected third-party and have to pay a cost to 
intervene. However, the underlying process that explains the development of third-party 
punishment is poorly understood. Here I examine to what extent age-effects and 
contemporaneous experiences of receiving unfair offers influence third-party punishment. In two 
studies, a total of N = 280 5- to 9-year-olds played a computer game in which they received 
either fair or unfair offers of coins from another player. In the subsequent test phase, children 
could intervene against unfair offers as an unaffected third-party. Across both experiments, I 
found that with age, children become increasingly more systematic in their decisions to intervene 
against unfair, but not against fair allocations. However, there was no strong evidence that an 
immediate experience of (un)fairness influenced children’s subsequent decisions. Together, our 
results suggest that children develop a sophisticated application of fairness norms with age that is 
not easily swayed by concurrent experiences. I discuss how these results contribute to the 
literature on the development of fairness. 
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The influence of age and experience of (un)fairness on third-party punishment in children 
TPP against distributional unfairness develops later in children compared to other types 
of moral transgressions. Children show the first sign of TPP around 5 years of age and 
demonstrate a reliable punishment from 6 years (Gummerum & Chu, 2014; House et al., 2020; 
Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015). In one study 
(McAuliffe et al., 2015), 6-year-olds show reliable TPP, punishing more often in unequal 
allocations than in equal allocations. Hence, even though they were an uninvolved third-party, 6-
year-olds reliably inflicted a cost on the selfish divider at their own cost whereas, 5-year-olds 
showed less reliable rates of punishment. This study suggests that costly TPP against unfairness 
develops between 5 and 6 years in children from the US (see House et al., 2020 for cross-cultural 
variations in children’s TPP). 
These results raise the question about the underlying process that explains this 
developmental trajectory. One potential reason is that older children are better able to take the 
perspective of the disadvantaged child. Under this hypothesis, older children are more adept at 
imagining what the victim of unfairness is experiencing and feel compelled to set things straight 
after they put themselves in the victim's shoes. This would be consistent with the notion that we 
rely on simulation to predict others’ minds and behaviors (Gordon, 1986; Harris, 1992). That is, 
one’s own mind can be used as a basis or a model for understanding other people (e.g., “What 
would I do if I were in the same situation?”). Importantly, the notion here is that an 
understanding of another person’s psychological world starts with one’s own experience. 
Therefore, having a similar experience in the past should be able to enrich the simulation 
process, leading to a better understanding of others in the same circumstance. Applied to the 
fairness context, children’s personal experience of unfairness could increase their sensitivity to a 
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third-party’s unfair sharing by allowing them to apply their experience and to simulate others’ 
minds (e.g., “What would I want to do if I were treated unfairly?”).  
Furthermore, prior work has hinted at the importance of children’s direct experience in 
their sense of fairness. These studies have shown how children react when they receive unfair 
sharing. For example, when children receive a smaller amount of resources than a peer partner, 
children as young as 4-years-old protest against the unfair allocation by choosing to receive none 
instead (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2015). Moreover, by directly comparing second- 
and third-party contexts, Bernhard, Martin, and Warneken (in press) found that 5- and 7-year-
olds are more likely to punish someone who treated them unfairly in a second-party context than 
when they witnessed how someone else was treated unfairly in a third-party context. These 
studies, therefore, suggest that the personal experience of receiving unfair treatment is perhaps 
primary in children’s desire to intervene and the developmental shift towards TPP consists of 
becoming able to apply this first-hand experience to others. One way to test this would be to 
provide children with the direct experience of unfair treatment as a facilitator of TPP. Building 
upon this idea, I hypothesized that children who received unfair allocations from others would be 
more likely to intervene against unfairness as a third-party compared to those who did not 
receive unfair allocations. 
An alternative hypothesis to this simulation account would be that as they grow older, 
children develop a more principle-based and perhaps impartial fairness concept. The idea here is 
that children do not necessarily rely on simulation by extending their own experiences. Instead, 
with age, they acquire and apply general fairness principles in a more unbiased, agent-neutral 
way, in which an interest or perspective of an agent (including children themselves) is not 
favored over that of another agent.  
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 Several pieces of evidence show that this hypothesis is plausible. For example, around 
age 8, children from the US give up their own resources to avoid getting more than others, 
showing an aversion to inequality advantageous to themselves (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw 
& Olson, 2012). Further, 8-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, punish unfair dividers not only when 
their ingroup members are harmed but also when outgroup members are harmed (Elenbaas, 
Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Jordan et al., 2014). Together, these studies suggest that with 
age, children apply fairness norms to the self and ingroup members as well as others and 
outgroup members, impartially adhering to the norm. This shows that children develop general 
principles that dictate their sense of distributional justice.  
Under this approach, the prediction would be that children’s own experience would not 
have a major influence on their subsequent TPP. Instead, regardless of their immediate personal 
experience, as children grow older, they develop general principles that guide how resources 
should be distributed and what is the right thing to do in the face of unfairness. 
Current Study 
The current study tested the impact of children’s previous sharing experiences on their 
subsequent willingness to punish unfairness at a personal cost. To manipulate children’s sharing 
experiences with other people, I developed a novel computer game, in which child participants 
have live interactions with other (computer-programmed) players and watch how they divide 
coins that can be exchanged for prizes afterward. Children were assigned to one of three 
conditions: (a) unfair experience condition, in which they always received unfair offers (0 out of 
6 coins) from another player, (b) fair experience condition, in which they always received fair 
offers (3 out of 3 coins) from another player, and (c) no experience condition, in which they did 
not play the role as a recipient at all. In the subsequent test phase, children played a third-party 
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punishment game, in which children as a third-party could observe how one player divides coins 
with another player and decide whether to punish the offer or not. 
I hypothesized that children in the unfair experience condition will be more likely to 
punish unfair offers as a third-party compared to those in the no experience or fair experience 
conditions. This hypothesis is built on the idea that experiencing unfairness at first hand would 
allow children to better simulate others’ perspectives and thus heighten their sensitivity to a 
third-party’s suffering.  
One alternative hypothesis is that children will show a similar rate of TPP across 
conditions, suggesting no influence of second-party experiences. Instead, with age, children 
become more reliable in punishing unfair over fair offers, regardless of their own prior 
experience. If I find results consistent with this prediction, it would imply that children develop 
general principles regarding fairness with age that motivates their intervention, and at least 
immediate personal experiences do not alter their motivation.  
Another potential outcome is that children will be less likely to intervene against 
unfairness after they have experienced unfairness themselves. While this might seem unlikely at 
first sight, there are two reasons why such an outcome should be considered. First, through their 
repeated first-hand experience of being treated unfairly, children might learn that people are 
selfish in the game and accept this as typical or normative behavior. Second, it is possible that 
children, who lost out by never being shared with are focused on the small amount of resources 
they ended up with, are therefore more hesitant to pay a cost to punish in a third-party context.  
General Method 
Experimental design and procedure. In both experiments, a female experimenter 
introduced the computer game referred to as the “coin game” to a child participant. I first 
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established that children could collect virtual coins that they could later exchange for prizes. 
Specifically, during a prize introduction, children saw an image of the prizes and the number of 
coins needed to purchase them later. The prizes and coins were shown as three tiers, illustrating 
that the more coins children have during the coin game, the more and the better prizes they could 
choose afterwards. For example, with a few coins, children could only have a sticky paper 
(lowest tier), but if they had a large number of coins, they could have a slinky, a ring, and a 
sticky paper (top tier). The prize introduction concluded with a comprehension check question 
about the prize hierarchy where the experimenter asked children to identify prize(s) they can 
have with the amount of coins at the lowest or the top tier. Children were correct in these 
comprehension check questions (98%) confirming their understanding of the exchange value of 
coins in the computer game.  
In the subsequent practice phase, the experimenter introduced the two other players in 
the game by saying that they were children of the same age and gender as the participants who 
are currently connected online but are at another location. For example, children were told that 
the other players are at another museum (for those who were tested at a museum) or at another 
park (for those who were tested at a park). However, in reality, the other players were computer-
programmed. The experimenter then introduced the role of the divider and the recipient. The 
divider can decide how to divide 6 coins between the self and the recipient. The divider can 
make one of two offers: equal offer (3 for the self, 3 for the recipient) or unequal offer (6 for the 
self, 0 for the recipient). The recipient was a passive player who can only accept the offer made 
by the divider.  
After introducing the roles, children saw the offers made by the divider enacted on the 
screen and practiced their role as a third-party punisher. The experimenter told children that after 
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the divider makes an offer to the recipient, they can press either the green button or the red 
button. If they push the green button (acceptance), the 6 coins will go into each player’s basket 
just the way the divider allocated the coins (e.g., if the divider splits it up 3:3, each player’s 
basket receives 3 coins), and the child’s own coin goes back into their own basket. That is, 
acceptances incurred no cost to the child.  
In contrast, if children push the red button (rejection), a vacuum will appear at the top of 
the screen and the 6 coins will be sucked up and disappear into the vacuum. Critically, to enact 
the rejection, children first had to pay their one coin into the vacuum. Therefore, pressing the red 
button serves as a costly third-party punishment.  
There were four practice trials in total. Children practiced four possible outcomes of each 
button (accept vs. reject) in each offer type (equal vs. unequal). The experimenter asked 
comprehension check questions about the consequence of each button and whether each button 
requires the payment of the child participant’s coin or not. When the child answered incorrectly, 
the experimenter corrected the answer and asked the question(s) again in the next practice trial. 
A majority of children (98%) answered correctly to the comprehension check questions. I 
excluded 6 out of 299 children (2%) who answered incorrectly in at least one of the 
comprehension check questions in the last practice trial from the data analysis.  
After the four practice trials, to make children believe that the other players are real, the 
experimenter pretended to make a phone call to the other players on the speakerphone and check 
if they are ready to play the game. In reality, another experimenter (confederate) answered the 
phone call, and there were no other players.  
Children received 20 coins as their initial endowment (coins that dropped into their 
basket on the screen).  
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Figure 5. Schematic representation of the design in Study 2A. 
In this example, Colton (left) was a divider and the child participant (right) was a recipient 
during the second-party game (experience phase). In the following third-party game (test phase), 
Jax (top left) was a divider and Finn (top right) was a recipient. The child participant (bottom) 
was a third-party observer. Regardless of conditions they were assigned, every child saw three 
equal offers (3:3) and three unequal offers (6:0) during the third-party game. 
 
For the experience phase, children were assigned to one of three conditions (between-
subject): fair experience condition, unfair experience condition, or no experience condition (see 
Figure 5). Children played the role of a passive recipient for four consecutive rounds during the 
second-party game with another (virtual) child as the divider. In the fair experience condition, 
the divider always kept 3 coins for the self and gave 3 coins to the child participant. In contrast, 
in the unfair experience condition, the divider always kept 6 coins for the self and gave 0 coins to 
the child. Those in the no experience condition (baseline condition) were unaware of the 
existence of the second-party game and did not play this game at all. After the first and the fourth 
round, the experimenter asked children to recall the number of coins they received from the 
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divider during the second-party game. Most children (99%) reported the number of coins they 
received correctly.  
During the subsequent test phase, children played 6 rounds of the third-party game where 
the child was in the role of the third-party and two other children were the divider and the 
recipient, respectively. Critically, however, the divider and recipient in the third-party game 
differed from those in the practice trials or those in the second-party game to prevent potential 
carryover or retaliation towards the same divider. Within the test trials, the role of each player 
remained the same (e.g., Jax was always the divider, while Finn was always the recipient). 96% 
of the time, children correctly identified players from the second-party game and those from the 
third-party game. This shows that children were not confused and were aware of who had played 
each game.  
There were 3 rounds with equal offers (3:3) and 3 rounds with unequal offers (6:0) 
presented in a pseudo-random order with a restriction that no more than two identical allocation 
types are presented consecutively. In each round, children could press one of two buttons (green 
or red) to either accept or reject the divider’s allocation towards the recipient (see Figure 5). 
Importantly, children were unaware of the total number of rounds in the third-party game to 
prevent them from calculating the number of coins they currently have and the number of 
remaining rounds, which could influence their decision whether to spend a coin or not in a given 
round. Our dependent measure was children's rate of rejection, with rejection (red button) coded 
as 1 and acceptance (green button) as 0.  
After the test phase, the experimenter left and a secondary experimenter asked children 
whether they think the players in the game are real or pretend players. Across two experiments, 
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91% of children (106 out of 120 in Study 2A, 149 out of 160 in Study 2B) reported that the 
players were real. 
In both experiments, I counterbalanced the trial order of offer types during the third-party 
game, player’s identity (names), left/right position of buttons (green button on the left vs. red 
button on the left), the order of practice trials (practice equal offer first vs. practice unequal offer 
first), and the order of comprehension check questions. Additionally, in Study 2B, I 
counterbalanced the color of boxes used in the winner and loser conditions. 
Data coding and statistical analyses. Children’s responses were automatically recorded 
by the computer game program, GameMaker Studio (https://www.yoyogames.com/gamemaker), 
and later checked and entered into a spreadsheet by independent coders. All statistical analyses 
were conducted with R statistical software (R version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 2018).  
In both experiments, I analyzed children’s rejection rate with Generalized Linear Mixed 
Models (GLMM) using the package glmmTMB (Brooks et al., 2017). In Study 2B in which I 
assessed children’s expectations about offers, I analyzed the change in children’s expectations 
about the divider’s offer with linear models. 
Our analysis procedure was as follows: (1) I examined a null model which included only 
subject ID in mixed models; (2) I created a full model which included our main predictors (e.g., 
age in months, condition, offer type) and all interactions among the predictors; (3) I compared 
the full model with the null model; (4) if the full model provided a significantly better fit to the 
data, I created a minimal model by sequentially dropping single terms from the full model, 
testing whether their inclusion improved the model fit; (5) I stopped this process and finalized 
our minimal model when dropping single terms no longer provided a better fit to the data.  
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As a supplementary analysis, I employed Bayesian statistics to provide more information 
about the robustness of our findings. A Bayes factor (BF) quantifies the degree to which the data 
favors the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis, and vice versa (Aczel et al., 2018; 
Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016). Conventionally, a BF between 1 and 3 indicates anecdotal 
evidence, a BF greater than 3 suggests moderate evidence, and a BF greater than 10 provides 
strong evidence in favor of one hypothesis over the other (Jeffreys, 1961). 
I computed BFs by comparing a GLMM in which a predictor of interest was included 
with a GLMM in which the predictor was not included, using the package brms (Bürkner, 2017). 
As in main analyses, I included subject ID as a random intercept in these models. The 
population-level regression coefficients had a weakly informative Student’s t distribution prior 
which was zero-centered with 3 degrees of freedom and a scale of 2.5 (Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, 
& Su, 2008). All models were run with 10,000 iterations with the first half as burn-in. 𝑅" was less 
than 1.01 for all parameters, suggesting convergence (Vehtari et al., 2019). 
I pre-registered both experiments before data collection. Pre-registered documents are 
available from AsPredicted: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=fy77e4 for Study 2A and 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=j33fi6 for Study 2B. All data and protocols are available 
through the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/upexj/?view_only=e3d5dea53d3c48e9b071580d82c2668a. 
Pilot Study 
In our pilot study, I tested N = 32 5- and 6-year-old children in a laboratory with fair 
experience and unfair experience conditions. I chose this age because previous research had 
suggested that children around 5 to 6 years show costly TPP (McAuliffe et al., 2015). I piloted 
our aforementioned procedure, where children first experienced allocations as a second-party 
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recipient and then played the third-party game as a third-party punisher. This pilot study 
established that children were able to understand the computer game.  
I found that children punished unequal offers more often than equal offers (LRT, χ2 (1) = 
28.48, b = 1.44, SE = 0.29, p < .001). Furthermore, children punished more often after an unfair 
experience than after a fair experience (LRT, χ2 (1) = 4.28, b = 1.09, SE = 0.54, p < .05). After 
this validation, I made minor modifications to streamline the procedure and used this method in 
Study 2A and 2B. For these experiments, I broadened the age range to 5- to 9-year-olds to 
examine potential developmental change. 
Study 2A 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 120 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 89.32 
months, range = 60 - 119 months, n = 24 in each age group, 40 per condition, 60 male, and 60 
female). Children were recruited and tested at museums or public parks in a city in the Midwest 
of the US. After parental consent, children were brought to a table with the study apparatus while 
the parents watched from a few steps away, instructed not to intervene. Demographic 
information such as race, education, and income was not assessed in this context.  
Ten additional children were excluded because they failed to answer correctly in at least 
one of the comprehension check questions about the consequences and costs involved in each 
button until the last practice trial (4), there was interference from a parent, sibling or a friend (4), 
the child was not an English-speaker and was unable to understand the instruction (1) or the 
parent declined to provide the child’s date of birth (1). 
Experimental design and procedure. I used the same basic design and procedure 
described in the General Method with an additional measure. After the completion of the third-
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party game, the experimenter asked children how close they feel to the recipient in the third-
party game. The perceived closeness to the recipient was assessed based on the prediction that 
children in the unfair experience condition would feel closer to the recipient in the third-party 
game compared to children in the fair experience condition.  
I adapted the Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) task developed by Aron, Aron, and 
Smollan (1992). Upon the completion of the study, the experimenter showed children five pairs 
of overlapping two circles with varying degrees. In each pair of circles, one of the circles 
represents the child participant with the figure from the third-party game and the other circle 
represents the recipient from the third-party game with his or her figure. The perceived closeness 
was represented as the degree of overlap between the two circles (from no overlap for no 
perceived closeness to almost complete overlap for highest closeness). 
Other than predicted, I found no differences in perceived closeness across three 
conditions. In this 5-point scale of perceived closeness, regardless of conditions, children tended 
to choose the pair with a medium degree of perceived closeness (No experience M = 3.10, SD = 
1.37; Fair experience M = 3.13, SD = 1.47; Unfair experience M = 3.10, SD = 1.32). Therefore, I 





Figure 6. Children’s punishment decisions in Study 2A. 
(A) Children’s rejection rate by condition in Study 2A. (B) Estimates of rejection rate based on 
the final model in Study 2A (collapsed across conditions). Error bars and confidence bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Rejection rate. A full GLMM on children’s punishment decision (0 = acceptance, 1 = 
rejection) with condition, offer type, age, and interactions among the predictors as fixed effects 
and subject ID as a random effect provided a significantly better fit to the data than the null 
model with only random intercepts (LRT, χ2 (11) = 139.69, p < .0001).  
Our critical question was whether children’s TPP varies depending on their experiences 
of (un)fairness. Results revealed a significant main effect of condition, LRT, χ2 (2) = 7.24, p = 
.03 (and no two- or three way interactions). Specifically, children in the unfair experience 
condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.42) punished significantly less often than those in the no experience 
condition (M = 0.33, SD = 0.47; b = 0.64, SE = 0.26, p = .01) or fair experience condition (M = 
0.32, SD = 0.47; b = 0.55, SE = 0.26, p = .03, see Figure 6A). By contrast, children in the no 
experience and fair experience condition did not differ from each other in their punishment rate 
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(b = 0.09, SE = 0.25, p > .72). These results suggest that the experience of unfairness decreased 
children’s punishment, while the experience of fairness had no effect relative to baseline. 
Another important question concerned whether children’s TPP changes with age. I found 
a significant interaction effect of age and offer type (LRT, χ2 (1) = 18.69, p < .001). To unpack 
this interaction, I ran separate models for equal and unequal offers. The results indicated that 
with increasing age, children become less likely to punish equal offers (LRT, χ2 (1) = 14.51, b = -
0.72, SE = 0.20, p < .001; see Figure 6B). However, there was no such age-related change in 
children’s punishment of unequal offers (LRT, χ2 (1) = 1.98, b = 0.19, SE = 0.13, p > .15). That 
is, their punishment of unequal offers remains relatively high across our age-groups but that of 
equal offers declines with age. Another question is at what age do children begin to reliably 
engage in costly TPP. Inspection of confidence intervals revealed that from 69 months of age 
(5.75 years), the confidence interval of equal offers no longer overlaps with that of unequal 
offers. Taken together, these findings suggest that (1) costly TPP develops between 5 and 6 
years, and (2) as they grow older, children become more selective about the target of their 
punishment, understanding better when to punish and when not to punish.  
To examine whether our results provide strong support for the effect of condition 
reported above, I computed Bayes factors (BF) for effects involving condition1. This revealed 
moderate evidence in favor of an absence of the main effect of condition (𝐵𝐹!" = 4.47), 
suggesting that the data is about 4 times more likely to be observed under the hypothesis that 
children’s prior experience has no effect than the hypothesis that prior experience has an effect 
 
 
1 As Bayes factors are sensitive to prior distributions, I examined four other prior distributions. The results with 
different priors suggest that our BFs are relatively robust against various prior distributions. Even with the 
exploration of four other priors, I did not find evidence supporting the effect of experience of (un)fairness on TPP. 
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on punishment. Furthermore, because I predicted that children will intervene more often in 
unequal offers than in equal offers after experiencing unfairness, I computed a BF of an 
interaction between condition and offer type, which provided evidence in support of an absence 
of the interaction effect (𝐵𝐹!" = 8.93). In contrast, I found very strong evidence for an interaction 
effect between age and offer type (𝐵𝐹"! = 805), indicating that the data is 805 times more likely 
to be observed under the hypothesis predicting an interaction effect than under the hypothesis 
that there is no such interaction.  
Taken together, results with BFs suggest that there is strong support for the finding that 
children intervene differently depending on their age. While children in the unfair experience 
condition were slightly less likely to punish offers, the Bayesian analysis indicates that this result 
should be interpreted with caution because there is no strong support for the effect of experiences 
of (un)fairness on TPP in children.   
Discussion of Study 2A 
In Study 2A, older children became increasingly more selective in their enactment of 
TPP. Also, I found that costly TPP emerges between 5 and 6 years of age, providing converging 
evidence to prior research (e.g., McAuliffe et al., 2015). These results suggest that children 
develop a sophisticated understanding of fairness norms and their application in a third-party 
context over development.  
One important question concerned if children’s experience as a recipient would influence 
their willingness to intervene against unfair allocations as a third-party. I found that if anything, 
receiving a series of unequal offers discouraged children’s subsequent third-party punishment. 
This result would be consistent with the hypothesis that experience of unfairness would decrease 
costly TPP, which opposes the prediction of the simulation account that the experience of 
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unfairness would promote TPP. However, further analysis using Bayes factors revealed that our 
data is moderately in favor of the absence of condition effect, suggesting that the significant 
main effect of condition found in Study 2A is questionable. Therefore, I conducted Study 2B to 
replicate the reduced TPP in the unfair experience condition.  
Furthermore, in Study 2B, I tried to disentangle two possible causes of the decrease in 
TPP in the unfair experience condition. One possibility is that children in the unfair experience 
condition showed reduced TPP because they feel coin-deprived. That is, even though children 
across three conditions received 20 coins as their initial endowment to play the third-party game, 
receiving 0 coins for four consecutive trials in the second-party game might have induced 
children to hold on to the remaining coins, leading to a decrease in costly TPP because of the 
cost. 
The alternative possibility is that during the second-party experience phase, children 
formed an expectation of how individuals treat each other in this game. That is, when children 
themselves were treated unfairly by their social partner, this mistreatment might have changed 
their expectations about how people should treat each other (e.g., “It seems fine to treat each 
other unfairly in this game as I was treated unfairly”), and thus did not feel compelled to 
intervene when someone acted unfairly. 
Study 2B was designed to disentangle these two possibilities by introducing non-social 
conditions in which a computer (instead of a peer divider) allocates coins in the second-party 
game. The number of coins children received in these non-social conditions were matched with 
those from the fair experience and unfair experience conditions except that children received 
coins based on the decision made by a computer. Additionally, I assessed how children’s 
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expectation about a divider’s offer changes after their own experience of receiving either equal 
or unequal offers. 
Study 2B 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 160 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 89.64 
months, range = 60 - 119 months, n = 32 in each age group, 40 per condition, 80 male and 80 
female) from the same population as in Study 2A. Demographic information such as race, 
education, and income was not assessed in this context.  
Nine additional children were excluded because they failed to answer correctly in at least 
one of the comprehension check questions about the consequences and costs involved in each 
button until the last practice trial (2), the child wanted to stop the study before the test phase (3), 
there was an experimental error (3) or the parent declined to provide the child’s date of birth (1). 
 
 
Figure 7. Schematic representation of the design in Study 2B. 
 42 
The figure illustrates how the second-party game in each condition differed by coin endowment 
(rich vs. poor) and agent type (social vs. nonsocial). In this example, 6 coins were divided 
between Colton (left) and the child participant (right). The labels “Fair”, “Unfair”, “Winner”, 
“Loser”, “Rich”, “Poor” etc. are added here for representation of the experimental design. 
Children never heard these words at any point in the study. 
 
Experimental design. A new feature was that there were two additional conditions: 
winner condition and loser condition. These two conditions differed from the fair experience 
condition and unfair experience condition in that the offers that children received during the 
second-party game were decided by a computer (not by a divider). These conditions were 
introduced to disentangle the two possibilities described above (i.e., whether children reduced 
punishment because they felt coin deprived or because they formed a certain expectation about 
how people treat each other in the game). To address this question, I had a 2 X 2 experimental 
design (see Figure 7) that differed by coin endowment (whether children received 3 coins every 
round [rich] vs. whether they received 0 coins every round [poor]) and agent type (whether the 
offer children received was decided by a social agent [divider] vs. whether the offer was decided 
by a non-social agent [computer]).  
The number of coins that children received during the second-party game was identical in 
both winner and fair experience conditions. Children in both conditions received 3 coins every 
round for four consecutive rounds. Similarly, the number of coins that children received during 
the second-party game was identical in both loser and unfair experience conditions. Children in 
both conditions received 0 coins every round for four consecutive rounds. 99% of the child 
participants correctly reported the number of coins they received during the second-party game, 
confirming our manipulation of coin endowment.  
The critical difference between social conditions (fair experience and unfair experience) 
and non-social conditions (winner and loser) was that children in the non-social conditions were 
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told that a computer decides how to divide coins between the child participant and another 
player. Concretely, in non-social conditions, children saw two boxes on the computer screen. In 
one box, all the cards showed equal offers (the child gets 3 coins and the other player gets 3 
coins), whereas all the cards in the other box showed unequal offers (the child gets 0 coins and 
the other player gets 6 coins). Children were told that the computer will choose one of the boxes 
and will decide how many coins the child can get. Once the computer chose one of two boxes, 
the same box was used for drawing a card throughout the rounds during the second-party game. 
For example, children in the winner condition saw that the computer chose the box with cards of 
equal offers and drew a card showing an equal offer in every round. Children (98%) correctly 
identified the agent (another player vs. computer) that is making the offers in the second-party 
game.  
There are at least three possible outcomes. The first possibility is that children in poor 
conditions (i.e., unfair experience and loser conditions) will show less TPP than those in rich 
conditions (i.e., fair experience and winner conditions). This finding would imply that children’s 
TPP is driven by the amount of coins they have or the perception that they are coin-deprived.  
A second possible outcome is that only those in the unfair experience condition will show 
a reduced rate of TPP compared to those in the other conditions. More specifically, children in 
the unfair experience condition might punish less often than those in the loser condition. Such a 
result would suggest that having an unfair experience from a peer divider would make children 
assume that selfish allocations are the norm in this game and therefore be less likely to intervene.  
The result would imply that TPP is influenced by children’s expectations about a typical way of 
dividing resources. 
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A third possibility is that children’s punishment will not differ depending on their 
experiences of (un)fairness. Thus, rather than an effect of experience condition, I would expect 
an effect of offer type mediated by an effect of age. Such a finding would suggest that the known 
developmental effect of children becoming more selective in their punishment as they mature is 
robust against any contemporaneous experiences. In other words, this potential outcome would 
indicate that TPP is driven by the development of fairness norms rather than a child’s immediate 
second-party experience of being treated fairly or unfairly. 
Procedure. I used the same procedure as in Study 2A, except for the following 
modifications. First, before and after they played the second-party game, the experimenter asked 
children to predict how a new divider will share six coins with a new recipient who did not have 
any previous history of social interactions or resource allocations. These questions were asked to 
see whether children’s expectations about resource allocations change depending on their 
second-party experience. Therefore, I posed this question before children had experienced 
another peer’s or a computer’s offer in the second-party game and once again after the second-
party game. I predicted that those who received allocations made by a computer (i.e., non-social 
conditions) will not change their expectations about how other people divide coins in this game, 
whereas those who received offers made by a player (i.e., social conditions) will change their 
expectations depending on whether they experience fair or unfair sharing.  
Second, I did not include the baseline (no experience) condition. Instead, I had a 2 X 2 
experimental design as described above.  
Third, unlike Study 2A, children played the second-party game before, not after, the 
practice trials of the third-party game. During piloting, I found that children in non-social 
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conditions had difficulties with the previous order of games used in Study 2A and showed less 
confusion when they played the second-party game before practicing the third-party game. 
Lastly, in this experiment, I did not include the perceived closeness measure because 
there was no difference in perceived closeness across conditions in Study 2A.  
Results 
 
Figure 8. Children’s expectation about a divider’s offer before and after the second-party 
game.  
In the Y-axis, 3 indicates children’s expectation of an equal offer (i.e., sharing 3 out of 6 coins). 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Change in children’s expectations about offer. I first calculated the change in 
children’s expectations about the divider’s offer by subtracting their prediction before the 
second-party game from that after the second-party game. Then, I ran a full linear model on 
children’s change in the expectations about the offer with agent type (social vs. nonsocial), coin 
endowment (poor vs. rich), age, and interactions among the predictors. The comparison between 
the full model and the null model with the only intercept indicated that the full model provided a 
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better fit to the data, F(7, 150) = 2.99, p < .012. There was no main effect and no interaction 
effect involving age (all ps > .54). Critically, I found a significant interaction effect between 
agent type and coin endowment on children’s change in expectations, F(1, 153) = 9.09, p < .01 
(see Figure 8).  
Specifically, in social conditions, children who received unequal offers in the unfair 
experience condition (M = -1.73, SD = 2.12) changed their expectations about the offer more 
dramatically and expected more selfish offers from another divider compared to those who 
received equal offers in the fair experience condition (M = -0.24, SD = 1.88; F(1, 75) = 10.68, b 
= 1.49, SE = 0.46, p < .01). In contrast, in conditions in which allocations were decided by a 
computer, children’s expectations about another divider’s offer did not differ between the winner 
(M = -0.33, SD = 1.82) and loser conditions (M = 0.00, SD = 1.69; F(1, 77) < 1, p > .41).  
These results confirmed that agent type was successfully manipulated given that children 
differentiated offers from social agents vs. non-social agents. Interestingly, those who 
experienced unequal offers from a social agent generalized their own experience to predict how 
another divider would treat a third-party. In contrast, those who experienced the same, unequal 
offers from a computer did not generalize their own experience to predict a divider’s offer. That 
is, children generalized their experience with a social agent to another social agent but not their 
experience with a non-social agent to a social agent. This result suggests that when forming 
expectations about how individuals will share coins in this game, children do not rely on mere 
observations of allocations (i.e., how frequently did the offer occur?), but consider whether the 
 
 
2 I excluded two participants’ predictions about the divider’s offer due to an experimental error during this phase. 
However, their responses in the third-party game were still included in the analysis of rejection rate as there were no 
experimental errors during the critical test phase. 
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allocation was an act of giving by a social agent, in which case they adjust their expectations on 




Figure 9. Children’s punishment decisions in Study 2B. 
(A) Children’s rejection rate by condition in Study 2B. (B) Estimates of rejection rate based on 
the final model in Study 2B (collapsed across conditions). Error bars and confidence bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Rejection rate. A full GLMM on children’s punishment decision (0 = acceptance, 1 = 
rejection) with agent type (social vs. nonsocial), coin endowment (poor vs. rich), offer type 
(equal vs. unequal), age, and interactions among the predictors as fixed effects and subject ID as 
a random effect provided a significantly better fit to the data than the null model with only 
random intercepts (LRT, χ2 (15) = 207.51, p < .0001).  
One critical question was whether children in the unfair experience condition would 
punish less often than those in the other conditions, which can be determined by an interaction 
between coin endowment and agent type. The results revealed that there was no two-way 
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interaction between agent type and coin endowment (LRT, χ2 (1) = 0.05, p > .82), suggesting that 
children showed a similar rate of TPP across conditions (see Figure 9).  
Another question was whether TPP is influenced by the amount of coins they had or a 
feeling of coin-deprivation, which can be determined by a main effect of coin endowment. I 
found that children in poor conditions and rich conditions did not show a significant difference in 
their rate of TPP (LRT, χ2 (1) = 0.04, p > .83). Also, children in social conditions and those in 
non-social conditions did not differ significantly in their rejection rate (LRT, χ2 (1) = 0.63, p > 
.42), implying that whether children received offers from a computer or a peer did not lead to a 
differential TPP. There were no other significant interactions involving either agent type or coin 
endowment (all ps > .08). These findings suggest that TPP in children is affected by neither the 
amount of coins they received nor an agent who treated them fairly or unfairly.  
The Bayes factors also confirmed the non-significant effects. I found strong evidence for 
an absence of an interaction between agent type and coin endowment (𝐵𝐹!" = 10.18), suggesting 
that these data are about 10 times more likely to be observed under the hypothesis predicting that 
there is no such interaction effect than the hypothesis predicting the interaction. Also, the BF of a 
three-way interaction among agent type, coin endowment, and offer type (𝐵𝐹!" = 4.03) revealed 
that the data is more consistent with the hypothesis predicting that there is no three-way 
interaction than the hypothesis predicting the interaction effect. BFs for main effects of coin 
endowment or agent type (𝐵𝐹!" = 15.72 and 𝐵𝐹!" = 10.91, respectively) suggest that the data is 
more consistent with the hypothesis that punishment was affected by neither the number of coins 
they had nor the type of the agent who made offers to the child.  
As in Study 2A, I found a significant interaction between age and offer type (LRT, χ2 (1) 
= 23.62, b = 0.82, SE = 0.17, p < .001). To unpack this interaction, I ran separate models for 
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equal and unequal offers and found that children were less likely to punish equal offers as they 
grow older (LRT, χ2 (1) = 9.00, b = -0.47, SE = 0.16, p < .01), replicating the results from Study 
2A. Furthermore, they were more likely to punish unequal offers with age (LRT, χ2 (1) = 11.55, b 
= 0.41, SE = 0.12, p < .001). In other words, as they grow older, children’s tendency to punish 
unequal offers increases, while the tendency to punish equal offers decreases. From 66 months of 
age (5.5 years), the confidence interval of equal offers no longer overlaps with that of unequal 
offers. I again found very strong evidence in favor of the interaction between age and offer type 
(𝐵𝐹"! = 8290), indicating that the data is 8290 times more likely to be observed under the 
hypothesis predicting the interaction over the hypothesis predicting no interaction effect. 
Together, these findings confirm the findings in Study 2A that (1) costly TPP emerges between 5 
and 6 years and that (2) children’s punishment becomes more selective with age.  
Discussion of Study 2B 
In Study 2B, children showed a similar rate of costly punishment regardless of their 
experience as a second-party. It is unlikely that children’s TPP is influenced by the amount of 
coins they received, given that children in poor conditions and rich conditions showed a 
comparable rate of TPP. Also, our findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that children’s 
inference on how individuals treat each other in the game affects their TPP. Specifically, children 
in the unfair experience conditions did not show a significant difference in TPP from those in 
other conditions. Interestingly, I found that children who received unequal offers from a social 
agent expected more selfish offers, while those who received unequal offers from a non-social 
agent did not show a dramatic change in their expectations. Yet, the change in children’s 
expectation about offers in the unfair experience condition did not result in a significant decrease 
in punishment rate.   
 50 
One major purpose of this study was to assess the robustness of the initial finding that 
children punish less after an unfair than fair experience. Although the effect found in Study 2A 
was statistically significant, our Bayes factor analyses had already indicated that this effect might 
not be strong. In fact, Study 2B showed that this effect did not replicate. Moreover, in both 
experiments, the Bayes factors for the effect of condition were in favor of the absence of the 
effect. Based on these results across experiments, it is more reasonable to conclude that there is a 
lack of support for the influence of second-party experience on TPP.   
 However, there were findings that have been consistent and strong in both Study 2A and 
2B. I found that children become more selective about the enactment of TPP. In Study 2B, with 
increased age, children were less likely to punish equal offers and were more likely to punish 
unequal offers, showing a better understanding of when a third-party’s intervention is needed. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that with age, children develop sophisticated 
general fairness principles.  
Discussion of Studies 2A & 2B 
 The current study examined the influence of experiencing (un)fairness on TPP in 5- to 9-
year-old children. This study was possible owing to our novel computer game task in which 
children’s experiences of (un)fairness were manipulated systematically. I started with the 
hypothesis that being exposed to unfairness personally would enable children to better simulate a 
third-party’s perspective, leading to an increase in following TPP. However, across two 
experiments, I found no evidence supporting the hypothesis. If anything, in Study 2A, children 
showed a decrease in TPP after receiving unfair offers. Further analyses revealed that this effect 
was overall weak and did not replicate in Study 2B. Here, children showed similar rates of TPP 
regardless of whether they experienced fair or unfair offers. Furthermore, Bayesian analyses 
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confirmed that the data in both Study 2A and 2B do not support the influence of sharing 
experiences. Together, these findings suggest that at least in the short-term, immediate 
experience of (un)fairness does not affect subsequent TPP in children aged 5 to 9.  
While there was no indication that prior experience affected children’s punishment, there 
was a very strong and consistent pattern regarding TPP observed in both experiments. I found 
that with age, children became more selective about the enactment of TPP: They became more 
likely to consistently punish unequal offers over equal offers. These results support the 
hypothesis that children develop more sophisticated fairness principles that guide how to divide 
resources and how to respond to a third-party’s unfair act. Moreover, these results show that 
children punish for fairness reasons and not out of spite or some reason unrelated to fairness. 
Lastly, Study 2B showed that children punish unfairness regardless of the relative amount of 
resources they have available. For children, it is not a luxury to intervene against unfairness 
when they have a surplus of resources, but they punish even when they have been relatively 
deprived of resources. 
Our findings contribute to the existing literature by showing that children employ fairness 
in an increasingly principled fashion over development. Previous research has suggested that 
with age, children not only endorse the fairness norms verbally but also adhere to the norms 
behaviorally (Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Smith et al., 2013). Furthermore, they apply the fairness 
norms in a consistent manner even when they could be disadvantaged by applying the fairness 
norms (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012) and even when their out-group 
members are disadvantaged (Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Jordan et al., 2014). Our 
results are consistent with the development of principled application of fairness norms. From 
around age 6, children were willing to pay a personal cost to enforce the fairness norms on 
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another individual even when they were an unaffected third-party. Moreover, this tendency 
became increasingly selective and systematic with age. Importantly, our data suggest that 
children’s enforcement of fairness norms is unlikely to be swayed by their immediate personal 
experiences (e.g., How many coins did I get? How did another person treat me?).  
 One potential concern is that the non-significant effect across experience conditions 
might be due to a lack of understanding of the task or some confusion about the resources. 
However, this possibility is unlikely given the ease with which children passed manipulation 
checks. Specifically, virtually all children (99%) in Study 2A and 2B correctly reported the 
number of coins they received during the second-party game, suggesting that they paid attention 
to the information. Also, most children (98%) in Study 2B correctly identified which agent had 
shared or not shared with them, suggesting that they paid attention to whether the offers were 
made by a peer or a computer. Furthermore, children expected more selfish offers in the unfair 
experience condition but not in the loser condition. This result suggests that children were able to 
differentiate offers made by a social agent from those made by a computer and readjusted their 
expectations about resource allocations accordingly. Based on the results, it would be reasonable 
to conclude that the lack of a condition difference is not due to a lack of understanding of the 
task.  
One remaining question is why second-party experience did not influence children’s 
punishment. One possibility is that the second-party experience of (un)fairness was too short and 
harmless to change TPP. Being exposed to unequal offers briefly may not be sufficient to induce 
such a change. In fact, studies with adults using more extreme moral norm violations suggest that 
victims who experienced extreme suffering (e.g., abuse, violence) were more likely to report 
feelings of empathy for victims who are undergoing suffering and were more likely to participate 
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in volunteer activities to help victims compared to those who did not experience such sufferings 
(see Staub & Vollhardt, 2008 for a review). Conversely, it is also known that people who were 
exposed to abuse or violence are more at risk of being a perpetrator than those who were not 
exposed to these events (Craig & Sprang, 2007; Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990; Fagan, 2005). In 
either case, it is possible that more extreme, long-term experiences of unfair treatment could 
have induced a change in children’s TPP. However, in the current study, I was only able to 
manipulate short-term, mild experiences of unfairness in children but not extreme or long-term 
unfair experience in children ― an experimental manipulation that is not possible for ethical 
reasons. One approach for future research would be to collect data on children’s experiences of 
unfairness in their daily life and relate it to their willingness to intervene in a third-party context. 
Another possibility is that children might not have made a connection between their own 
experience and the other peer’s experience. That is, children failed to take the perspective of the 
recipient in the third-party game. Prior research with adults has shown that adult participants, 
who were instructed to take the perspective of the recipient of an unfair offer as much as they 
can, showed a higher TPP than those instructed to take an objective perspective and remained 
detached from the recipient (Pfattheicher, Sassenrath, & Keller, 2019). This study implies the 
importance of taking the victim’s perspective in TPP which might not be a skill automatically 
employed by children. Future research could examine if children would show an increase in TPP 
when they are given more explicit instruction to take the perspective of the recipient. 
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Chapter 4: Study 3 
Do Children Punish Unfairness to Deter Personal Mistreatment? 
 
Abstract 
Third-party punishment has been claimed as a mechanism to deter personal mistreatment. The 
current study examined if third-party punishment in children is motivated to prevent unfair 
treatment directed to the self. In this pre-registered study, N = 120 5-to-9-year-olds played a 
third-party game in which they could decide whether to punish a divider who made unfair 
resource allocations to another person. Critically, before playing the third-party game, children 
were told that either the same, selfish divider (Same divider condition) or a new, different divider 
(Different divider condition) would share resources with them in a game followed by the third-
party game. If children punish unfairness to deter future mistreatment, they will enact 
punishment more often when they need to re-encounter the same divider than when they do not 
have to. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, I found that children’s punishment rate does not 
change depending on the possibility of future interactions with the same divider.
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Do children punish unfairness to deter personal mistreatment? 
What motivates children’s third-party punishment against unfairness? While little data 
exists to assess the proximate causes of children’s third-party punishment, we can draw 
inferences from a large body of work with adults. One prevailing theory focuses on the goal to 
benefit the group. Specifically, this approach views punishment as a mechanism to eradicate 
selfish individuals to improve the welfare and survival of the group (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Gurerk et al., 2006). For example, when faced 
with extinction threats such as wars, famines or environmental catastrophes, groups with 
individuals who sanction free riders would be more likely to survive than groups with no 
punishment towards free riders (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Mathew & Boyd, 2011). 
This approach assumes that people have an altruistic disposition to punish selfish behaviors 
(Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). 
On the contrary, another common theory claims that punishment serves future benefits 
for punishers themselves, not their group. To elaborate, this approach contends that adults punish 
perpetrators to deter personal exploitation and to get a better bargain for themselves directly 
(Peterson, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2010). Studies have shown that people are more likely to 
punish unfair dividers when they inferred that the divider would treat them poorly than when 
they inferred that the divider would treat a third party poorly (Delton & Krasnow, 2017; 
Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). For instance, the more people predicted that they 
would be mistreated by the divider, the more third-party punishment they enacted towards the 
divider. Interestingly, punishers’ prediction about how the divider would treat a third-party was 
not correlated with the enactment of third-party punishment (Krasnow et al., 2016). These 
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findings suggest that a concern that punishers themselves would be mistreated by the divider (not 
a concern for a third-party victim) underlies third-party punishment in adults.  
To our knowledge, there is no research that has directly tested whether children’s third-
party punishment is motivated by potential possibility of personal mistreatment. More 
specifically, here I examine if children’s punishment rate changes depending on whether they 
will interact with the same, selfish divider in the future. I start with the notion that at least in 
some contexts, children start to think about future from age 3 and engage in more sophisticated 
prospective thinking from age 5 (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005). Therefore, it is possible that 
children’s emerging ability to think about the future enables them to punish unfair dividers to 
deter potential mistreatment of the self. The current study investigates whether children enact 
third-party punishment to deter personal mistreatment.   
To examine this question, I presented participants with a third-party game in which they 
observed either fair (3:3) or unfair allocations (6:0) between a divider and a recipient as an 
unaffected third-party. Critically, before playing the third-party game, child participants learned 
that in the subsequent two-party game, they will receive resources (e.g., coins) from the same 
divider from the third-party game (Same divider condition) or from a new divider (Different 
divider condition). Thus, depending on condition they were assigned, children learned whether 
they need to interact with the same divider again in the future or not. 
 I tested the hypothesis that children would use punishment to deter potential mistreatment 
in the future (“Deterrence hypothesis”). Concretely, if children use third-party punishment as a 
way to prevent future mistreatment, they will punish unfair allocations more often during the 
third-party game when they have to interact with the same divider in the following game (Same 
divider condition) than when they do not have to interact with the same divider (Different divider 
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condition). Alternatively, if children fear retaliation from the divider (“Appeasement 
hypothesis”), they will punish unfair allocations less often when they have to interact with the 
same divider in the future (Same divider condition) compared to when they do not have to 
interact with the same individual (Different divider condition). Our study was designed to assess 
these different hypotheses. 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 120 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 89.2 months, 
range = 61 - 120 months, n = 60 per condition, n = 24 in each age group, 60 male, 60 female). 
Children were tested at a museum or public parks in the Midwest of the US. Demographic 
information such as race, education and income could not be obtained. Thirteen additional 
children were excluded because of failure to correctly answer at least one of the comprehension 
checks (9), parental interference (2), being unable to understand English (1) or having 
participated in a similar study involving third-party punishment before (1).  
Experimental design and procedure.  After parents gave written consent, children sat at 
a table with the study apparatus while the parents watched passively from a few steps away. A 
female experimenter introduced the computer game referred to as the “coin game” and explained 
that players could collect virtual coins to later exchange for prizes. During a prize introduction, 
children learned that the more coins they have during the coin game, the more and the better 
prizes they would be able to choose afterwards. 
In the subsequent practice phase, the experimenter introduced the two other players in 
the game by stating that they were children of the same age and gender at another museum (or 
another park), who are currently connected online. The experimenter introduced children to a 
third-party game (see Figure 10) in which they can decide whether to punish an allocation as an 
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uninvolved third-party observer. Specifically, children learned the role of the divider and the 
recipient. The divider could make one of two allocations: (a) 3 for the self and 3 for the recipient, 
or (b) 6 for the self and 0 for the recipient. The recipient was a passive player who could only 
accept the divider’s allocation. During the practice of the third-party game, children learned the 
consequences of pressing the green (acceptance at no costs) or red button (rejection at a cost).  
 
 
Figure 10. Computer screen display of the coin game in the same divider condition.  
In this example, Finn was the divider in both third-party and second-party games. 
 
In the subsequent manipulation phase, children in both conditions were told that, after 
playing the third-party game, they will play a second-party game in which a divider allocates 
coins between the self and the child participant. Critically, children were assigned to one of two 
conditions. In the Same divider condition, children were told that the same divider from the 
third-party game will decide how to share coins with the child. In the Different divider condition, 
they were told that a new divider will decide how to share coins with the child.  
In both conditions, to visualize the possibility of future interactions with the same or 
different divider, the computer game display indicated the future divider in the second-party 
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game (see the bottom of the display in Figure 10). For example, in the same divider condition, 
the experimenter told children that the same divider from the third-party game (e.g., Finn in 
Figure 10) will be moved to the bottom left corner on the screen in the second-party game, and 
the child participant will be moved to the bottom right corner on the screen. In the different 
divider condition, children learned that a new divider (e.g., Jax in Figure 11) who does not play 
the third-party game at all will appear at the bottom left corner and the child participant will be 
moved to the bottom right corner in the second-party game.  
 
Figure 11. Computer screen display of the coin game in the different divider condition. 
In this example, Colton was a divider in a third-party game, while Jax was a new divider in the 
second-party game. 
 
In both conditions, the experimenter told children that both the divider and the recipient 
in the third-party game could see the child participant’s decisions to reject or accept an 
allocation. Children in the different divider condition were additionally told that the new divider 
could not see their decisions to reject or accept during the third-party game.  
At the end of the manipulation phase, the experimenter asked comprehension check 
questions to assess (a) whether children could correctly identify the divider and recipient in the 
following second-party game and (b) whether they understood that the divider and recipient in 
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the third-party game (but not a new divider in the second-party game) could see their punishment 
decisions. I found that most children were able to correctly identify the divider (83% of 
participants) and the recipient (93% of participants) in the second-party game. Also, most 
children understood that the divider and the recipient in the third-party game could see their 
punishment decisions (91% and 88%, respectively, across two conditions), while the new divider 
could not (87% from those in different divider condition). When children answered incorrectly in 
these comprehension check questions, the experimenter provided a correct answer to the child. 
After learning about the possibility of re-encountering the same divider in the future, 
children in both conditions played the identical third-party game (test phase) in which they can 
decide whether to punish an allocation by pressing either green (acceptance) or red button 
(rejection). Children were presented with 8 allocation trials in total. Importantly, the divider 
made an unfair allocation (6:0) in 6 trials, while he or she made a fair allocation (3:3) in 2 trials. 
This manipulation was intended to make children perceive the divider as a selfish individual, 
which should in turn allow children to predict that the divider would share resources in a selfish 
manner with the child participant in the subsequent second-party game.  
Upon the completion of the third-party game, to check whether children perceive the 
divider from the third-party game as a selfish individual, the experimenter asked children to 
recall whether the divider kept all coins for the self most of the time or whether the person shared 
coins with the recipient most of the time. The result was that a vast majority of children (83%) 
correctly recalled that the divider in the third-party game kept all coins for the self in a majority 
of the trials. In addition, children were asked to predict whether the divider in the second-party 
game would share fairly (3 out of 6 coins) or unfairly (0 out of 6 coins) with the child participant. 
I predicted that children in the same divider condition should be more likely to predict unfair 
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sharing from the second-party game’s divider (as the same divider had been selfish during the 
third-party game) than children in the different divider condition who were asked to make a 
prediction about a new divider who did not have any sharing history. Contrary to the prediction, 
in both conditions, I found that a majority of children (77%) expected a fair sharing (i.e., 
receiving 3 out of 6) from the same divider as well as different divider (46 out of 60 participants 
expected fair sharing in both conditions). This result suggests that children have an optimistic 
expectation that they will be treated fairly even in the same divider condition, in which their own 
observation (i.e., the divider was selfish towards a third party in 6 out 8 trials) directly 
contradicted their optimistic expectation. Also, this optimistic expectation cannot be attributed to 
children’s difficulty with remembering the divider’s behavior because most children correctly 
recalled that the divider in the third-party game acted selfishly in most of the time. 
At the end of the study, the experimenter left and a secondary experimenter asked 
children whether they thought the players were real or pretend. I found that 80% of children said 
the players were real. 
I counterbalanced the order of test trials, practice trials, comprehension check questions, 
position of green and red buttons, and the other player’s identity. 
Data coding and analyses. Children’s responses were automatically recorded by 
GameMaker Studio (https://www.yoyogames.com) and later checked and entered into a 
spreadsheet by independent coders. All statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical 
software (R version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 2018).  
I compared a full Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM), which included age in 
months and condition and an interaction between age and condition as fixed effects and subject 
ID as a random effect with a null model, which included only subject ID as a random intercept. If 
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the full model provided a significantly better fit to the data, I created a minimal model by 
sequentially dropping single terms from the full model, and finalized our minimal model when 
dropping single terms no longer provided a better fit to the data. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis. I first analyzed whether children were more likely to reject unfair 
over fair allocations. A full GLMM on children’s punishment decision (0 = acceptance, 1 = 
rejection) with offer type (fair vs. unfair), age and an interaction between offer type and age as 
fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect provided a significantly better fit to the data than 
the null model with only random intercepts (LRT, χ2 (3) = 82.79, p < .001). I found a significant 
main effect of offer type on punishment decision (see Figure 12A), LRT, χ2 (1) = 82.64, p < .001. 
These results confirm that children punished unfair allocations more often than fair allocations as 
shown in other studies with children (e.g., House et al., 2020; Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et 
al., 2015). There were a non-significant interaction between offer type and age, LRT, χ2 (1) < 1, p 




Figure 12. Children’s punishment decisions in Study 3.  
(A) Estimates of rejection rate by offer type and age. (B) Estimates of rejection rate by condition 
and age. 
 
Rejection rate. As there were more unfair trials than fair trials (6 vs. 2 trials), in the 
further analysis, I excluded children’s responses to fair allocation trials and analyzed responses 
to unfair allocations exclusively. A full GLMM on children’s punishment decision (0 = 
acceptance, 1 = rejection) with condition (same vs. different divider), age and an interaction 
between condition and age as fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect did not provide a 
better fit to the data than the null model with only random intercepts (LRT, χ2 (3) = 3.27, p > 
.35). These findings indicate that children’s punishment of unfair allocations did not differ 
significantly depending on condition (see Figure 12B).  
Discussion of Study 3 
The current study examined the deterrence hypothesis in which 5- to 9-year-old children 
are more likely to punish an unfair individual when they need to interact with the person in the 
future than when they do not need to. Our results suggest that children overall punish unfair 
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allocations more often than fair allocations. Critically, however, Children’s rate of punishment 
towards unfair allocations did not differ depending on the possibility of re-encountering the same 
divider in the future. This finding is inconsistent with the deterrent hypothesis in which children 
should increase their punishment when they were told that the same divider would decide how to 
allocate resources between the self and the child participant in the future. Also, our findings do 
not support the appeasement hypothesis in which children would fear retaliation from the divider 
and would show a decrease in punishment when told to re-encounter the same divider in the 
future.  
Why did third-party punishment not change depending on condition? One possibility is 
that children in the current study did not infer unfair treatment of themselves from observing 
how the selfish divider treated a third-party. This possibility is supported by children’s optimistic 
expectation about fair sharing. Concretely, in the present study, a majority of children expected 
that they would be treated fairly by a divider regardless of conditions. Interestingly, even 
children in the same divider condition who witnessed that the divider tended to make a selfish 
allocation expected that they would be given special treatment and receive a fair offer from the 
selfish divider in the following game. Hence, it is likely that children’s general optimism about 
how they would be treated led to a non-difference in punishment rate between conditions. 
 To address children’s optimistic bias about self, future research should investigate 
whether children infer deterrence-based motive when they hear a story about a third-party 
punisher. If children successfully infer that punishment could be driven by a motivation to deter 
future mistreatment, it would suggest that children could reason about the function of 
punishment in terms of deterrence when they are completely uninvolved with the situation, but 
they are not yet able to incorporate this reasoning into their own punishment behavior potentially 
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due to their optimistic self-serving bias when they themselves are the recipient. Alternatively, if 
children do not reason about punishment in terms of deterrence motive even in a context in 
which they passively observe third-party punishment, it would suggest that at least children 
around this age do not think of third-party punishment in terms of deterrence motive at all. 
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Chapter 5: Study 4 
Children’s Evaluations of Third-party Responses to Unfairness: Children Prefer 
Helping over Punishment 
 
Abstract 
Third-party punishment of selfish individuals is an important mechanism to intervene against 
unfairness. However, there is another way in which third parties can intervene. Rather than 
focusing on the unfair individual, third parties can choose to help those who were treated unfairly 
by reducing inequality. Such third-party helping as an alternative to third-party punishment has 
received little attention in studies with children. Across four studies, I examined the evaluations 
of third-party punishment versus third-party helping in N = 322 5- to 9-year-old children. Study 
4A, 4C and 4D showed that when asked about the agents directly, children evaluated both 
helpers and punishers positively, but they preferred helpers over punishers overall. When asked 
about the type of intervention itself, children preferred helping over punishment, suggesting that 
their preference for the type of intervention corresponds to how children think about the agents 
performing these interventions. Study 4B showed that children’s preference for third-party 
helping is driven by distributive justice concerns and not a mere preference for giving or 
resource maximization as children consider which type of third-party intervention decreases 
inequality. Together, this series of studies demonstrate that children between 5 and 9 years of age 
develop a sophisticated understanding of punishment and helping as two adequate forms of 
intervention but also display a preference for third-party helping. I discuss how these findings 
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and prior work with adults supports the hypothesis of developmental continuity, showing that a 
preference for helping over punishment is deeply rooted in ontogeny. 
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Children's evaluations of third-party responses to unfairness: Children prefer helping over 
punishment 
Notwithstanding the important insights gained from studies of third-party punishment, it 
is by no means the only way to intervene against moral transgressions. For example, rather than 
punishing the agent of the act, a third party might choose to help the patient who has been placed 
at a disadvantage. With punishment targeting the perpetrator and helping targeting the recipient 
of unfair treatment, third-party punishment and helping focus on different aspects of justice 
restoration. While third-party punishment has been studied extensively with adults and to some 
extent in children, very little research has been devoted to third-party helping, despite its equal 
importance.  
Several experiments have tested whether adults want to help or punish when they are the 
third party. Some studies find that adults would rather like to help the recipient than to punish the 
perpetrator (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), although 
others found the reverse preference (e.g., FeldmanHall et al., 2014; Stallen et al., 2018). Findings 
are more consistent with how adults evaluate punishers and helpers. Overall, adults prefer third 
parties who help recipients over those who punish transgressors. For example, when observing 
how one person was unfair to a recipient, adults were more likely to reward a third-party helper 
who gave resources to the recipient rather than a third party who punished the unfair divider 
(Raihani & Bshary, 2015a). Similarly, further studies showed that helpers were perceived to have 
superior moral character (e.g., warmth) compared to punishers (Patil, Dhaliwal, & Cushman, 
2018) and are more likely to be trusted as a partner in economic interactions (Jordan et al., 2016; 
Patil, Dhaliwal, & Cushman, 2018). These results imply that third-party helping is not only 
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regarded as a viable, important response to unfairness but also gains an even more positive 
reputation than punishment. 
Current Study 
Here I aim to examine (1) whether children evaluate third-party punishers positively or 
negatively and (2) how punishers are evaluated in comparison with helpers focusing specifically 
on fairness violations. To our knowledge, it has not been studied how children evaluate punishers 
versus helpers when they are presented as two options to respond to unfairness. Given the 
finding that adults prefer helpers over punishers, it is important to investigate how children think 
about these forms of intervention and to trace its developmental trajectory. 
One hypothesis is that children would show a pattern of results similar to adults. That is, 
regardless of their age, children might evaluate both helpers and punishers positively overall, but 
when forced to choose, they might regard helpers as even more positive than punishers. Under 
this hypothesis, the preference of adults for helpers over punishers is a psychological 
phenomenon that already appears early in development when children begin to reason about 
third-party punishment.  
A plausible alternative hypothesis is that children undergo major developmental changes 
in their preferences, where young children evaluate only helpers positively, while they view 
punishers as negative or neutral at best potentially due to punishment being an antagonistic 
behavior (i.e., taking resources away from a person). With increasing age, children might 
evaluate punishers more positively as they gain a better understanding of potential benefits of 
punishment such as maintenance of norms and deterrence of transgressions (see Bregant, Shaw, 
& Kinzler, 2016 for children’s understanding of the deterrent effect of punishment).  
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Here I present a series of studies comprising a pilot study to validate our new task and 
four studies to address the above hypotheses.  
General Methods 
Experimental design and procedure. Across four studies, children heard a story about 
four actors — one divider, one recipient and two third parties — who played a candy game at a 
summer camp. The experimenter walked children through the story with visual aids by using 
paper-cut actors and candies. The actors were matched to the gender of the participant.  
At the beginning of the story, the divider and the recipient have two candies each. Then, 
the divider can decide how to divide the additional two candies (see Figure 13). Children were 
told that the divider can keep both candies or give some of the candies to the recipient.  
In fact, because I was interested in how children respond to fairness violations, the divider 
always kept both candies for themselves, resulting in unequal allocation (4:2 between the divider 
and recipient).  
Before showing children an unfair allocation made by the divider, I assessed whether 
children endorse sharing by asking what number of candies the divider should give to the 
recipient. It was important to confirm that children endorse sharing because otherwise, they 
would not be able to understand the purpose and intention of third-party intervention. Across 
four studies, a majority of children (80%) endorsed equal sharing (i.e., sharing 1 out of 2 
candies) (65 out of 80 participants in Study 4A, 62 out of 80 participants in Study 4B, 65 out of 
80 participants in Study 4C, and 66 out of 82 participants in Study 4D), and the remaining 20% 
stated the divider should give 2 out of 2 candies to the recipient, χ2 (1) = 116.9, p < .001. I 
excluded children from analyses if they considered it acceptable for the divider not to share with 
the recipient (i.e., giving 0 candies).   
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Figure 13. Schematic set-up of stimuli used in Study 4A.  
The two panels at the top show an unfair allocation. The two panels on the left show a helping 
scenario, while those on the right show a punishment scenario. Each panel shows the laminated 
figures and objects used by the experimenter to illustrate the different scenarios to the child. The 
labels “Helper”, “Punisher” etc. are added here for reading comprehension. Children never heard 
the word “helper” or “punisher” at any point in the story.  
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Table 1. Experimental design with resource allocation (Divider:Recipient) 












Punishment 2:2 0 
Study 4B 











Irrational 4:0 4 
 
After seeing the unfair allocation, each child heard both punishment and helping 
scenarios. In each scenario, the third parties have three options: (1) give two candies to the 
recipient by paying own chocolate (i.e., costly helping), (2) take two candies away from the 
unfair divider by paying own chocolate (i.e., costly punishment) or (3) do nothing. In the helping 
scenario, one of the two third parties decides to give two candies to the recipient by paying his or 
her own chocolate (see Figure 13 and Table 1). By contrast, in the punishment scenario, the 
other third-party decides to take two candies away from the unfair divider by paying a chocolate. 
The payment of a chocolate in this case represents a personal cost that the third-party has to bear. 
I made each third-party intervention costly because the payment of a cost could remove the 
doubt in observers that the third-party’s intervention is motivated by a self-serving desire and can 
signal that the third-party genuinely cares about others (Balliet et al., 2011; Nelissen, 2008; 
Raihani & Bshary, 2015b). In each scenario, only one of the two third-parties was involved. 
Children were told that the other third-party who was not involved in a given scenario was 
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reading a book. This was to prevent children from blaming the non-involved third-party for not 
intervening.  
After hearing both scenarios, children were asked test questions. Two primary measures 
were kept constant across four studies: (1) Children’s liking of each third-party actor on a 7-point 
smiley face Likert scale and (2) their forced-choice preference between the two third parties 
(e.g., who do you like better?).  
During the warm-up phase (i.e., before children heard the story), children practiced how 
to use a Likert scale to indicate their liking (Study 4A through 4D) and their agreement about an 
action (Study 4C and 4D). Children were asked to point to one of the faces on the Likert scale for 
something they really like or really do not like, ranging from -3 (do not like it at all) to +3 (like it 
a lot). Also, they were asked to point to a face on the Likert scale for something they strongly 
agree or strongly disagree, ranging from -3 (totally disagree) to +3 (totally agree). Children’s 
responses during the practice confirmed that they can use the Likert scale to indicate their 
agreement in a flexible manner.  
I define third-party helping as a third-party’s compensation of payoffs to another 
individual. This term was used for consistency with other similar studies with adults (e.g., 
Raihani & Bshary, 2015a; Jordan et al., 2015). 
In all four studies, I counterbalanced the order of scenarios (punishment scenario first vs. 
helping scenario first), the order of the Likert scale (introduce positive rating first vs. negative 
rating first), the order of comprehension check questions, the order of test questions and 
appearances of third-party actors. 
Data coding and analyses. Children’s responses were live coded by the experimenter 
and later checked by an independent video coder. Disagreements between live and video coding 
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were resolved by re-watching the video. All statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical 
software (R version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 2018). In our analyses, I entered the age in months, not 
in years.  
In all studies, I analyzed children’s endorsement of equal sharing with a goodness-of-fit 
chi-square test, their responses in the Likert scale rating with one sample t-tests (two-tailed) and 
their responses in the forced-choice measures with binomial tests (two-tailed). To test the effect 
of age, I ran Linear Mixed Models (LMM) on the Likert scale ratings using the package ‘nlme’ 
(Pinheiro et al., 2018), Generalized Linear Models (GLM) on the social preference scores and 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) on forced choices using the package ‘lme4’ (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). 
Our analysis procedure was as follows: (1) I examined a null model, which included only 
subject ID in mixed models and only intercept in the linear models; (2) I created a full model, 
which included our main predictors (e.g., intervention type, age in months) and all interactions 
among the predictors; (3) I compared the full model with the null model; (4) if the full model 
provided a significantly better fit to the data, I created a minimal model by sequentially dropping 
single terms from the full model, testing whether their inclusion improved the model fit; (5) I 
stopped this process and finalized our minimal model when dropping single terms no longer 
provided a better fit to the data.  
I proceeded to test individual predictor variables only if the full model with predictors 
provided a significantly better fit to the data than the null model. Moreover, since the current 
four studies comprised a large number of analyses, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I report 
test statistics only for the final model.  
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Figures show predicted estimates with 95% confidence intervals based on the final 
model. All data and protocols are available through the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/8wxtj/?view_only=f46dc44bf88845cbb93016a91371d62d. 
Pilot Study 
In our pilot study, I tested N = 32 6- to 7-year-old children. I chose this initial age 
because prior work had established that children 6 years and older reliably detect violations of 
fairness norms and are willing to punish transgressions (e.g., Jordan et al., 2014; McAuliffe et 
al., 2015). I piloted our aforementioned task, where children heard about a third-party who 
punished an unfair divider, whereas another third-party helped the recipient of the unfair 
allocation. Our dependent measures were children’s liking of each third-party character 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale and a forced-choice task to choose between the punisher or 
the helpers. This pilot established that children were able to follow the story, the task, and the 
measures, as established through comprehension checks. Moreover, the results indicated that 
children evaluated both third parties positively, but they tended to prefer helpers over punishers. 
After this first validation, I made minor modifications to streamline the procedure and used this 
method for a series of four studies. For these studies, I broadened the age range to 5- to 9-year-
olds to examine potential developmental change. 
Study 4A: How Do Children Evaluate Helpers and Punishers? 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 80 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 89.33 months, 
range = 60 - 118 months, n = 16 participants in each age group, 40 female). Children were 
recruited and tested in a public park in an urban area in the US. After parental consent, children 
were brought to a table with the study apparatus while the parents watched from a few steps 
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away, instructed not to intervene. Demographic information such as race, education, and income 
were not assessed in this context. Fourteen additional children were excluded because they failed 
to identify the helper and punisher during both memory check questions (9) or they did not 
endorse sharing and said that the divider should give zero candies to the recipient (5). 
Experimental design and procedure. I used the same basic design and procedure 
described in General Methods, with the following additional measures. In the forced-choice 
questions, I asked not only who they like better between the helper and the punisher (labeled 
“like better”) but also who they want to be friends with (labeled “friend”), who they want to 
invite to their party (labeled “party”).  
Furthermore, to explore children’s reasoning behind their preference for punishers and 
helpers, I tested whether children attribute relevant traits to either the punisher or helper. For 
instance, children were asked who is more likely to get into a fight (to see if they attribute 
“aggression” to punishers), who is more likely to tell a person who cut in line to go back (to see 
if they attribute “norm enforcement” to punishers), who is more likely to give more turns to ride 
a bike to others (to see if they attribute “generosity” to helpers), and who is more likely to 
comfort a crying child (to see if they attribute “empathy” to helpers). These forced-choice trait 
attribution questions were asked with other social preference questions (e.g., like better, friend, 
party) during the test phase. Our trait attribution tasks measured a relative trait inference (e.g., 
“helper is more generous than punisher”) instead of whether children reasoned about a single 
person (e.g., “helper is generous”) (see Liu & Vanderbilt, 2013). 
Results 
Evaluations in Likert scale ratings. Children evaluated both the helper and the punisher 
positively. Children’s evaluation of both the helper (M = 2.15, SD = 1.29) and punisher (M = 
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1.84, SD = 1.35) differed significantly from neutral (one sample t-tests; t(79) = 14.87, p < .001 
and t(79) = 12.14, p < .001, respectively). The results from an LMM indicated that neither age 
nor intervention type (helper vs. punisher) had a significant effect on children’s ratings. These 
analyses show that children’s ratings of helpers and that of punishers did not differ significantly 
at all ages (see Figure 14A). The result from a paired t-test revealed that children tended to rate 
the helper more positively than the punisher with a marginal significance, t(79) = 1.72, p = .09. 
Social preference in forced-choice questions. I first analyzed all three preference 
questions separately. Children chose helpers over punishers when asked who they liked better 
(73%; binomial test, p < .001) and who they wanted to invite to their party (66%, p < .01). 
However, their preference for helpers did not differ from chance when asked who they would 
choose as a friend (60%; p = .09; see Table 2). One question is why children’s preference was 
more pronounced in the ‘like better’ question than in ‘party’ or ‘friend’ questions (note that the 
preferences in these two questions were trending towards helpers as well). I speculate that the 
friend and party questions might involve other social motivations. For example, regardless of 
who they like personally, some children might want to associate with the punisher who might 
seem socially dominant or seem to have power and assertiveness. By contrast, the ‘like better’ 
question is a more direct and pure measure of social preference per se. 
Children’s responses in the three forced-choice questions (friend, party and like better) 
were intercorrelated (Cronbach’s α = .63). Thus, in subsequent analyses, I averaged responses to 
the three forced-choice questions for each child, which I refer to as the social preference score 
(helper = 1, punisher = 0) with higher values reflecting a preference for helpers over punishers. 
The results from a full GLM including age as a fixed effect revealed that there was no significant 
effect of age on children’s social preference score, χ2 (1) = 2.02, p > .15 (see Figure 14C). 
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Overall, in the forced-choice preference questions, children preferred helpers to punishers 
irrespective of their age. 
 
 
Figure 14. Likert scale ratings and social preference scores in Study 4A and 4B. 
(A) Likert scale ratings of helpers and punishers in Study 4A. (B) Likert scale ratings of rational 
and irrational third parties in Study 4B. (C) Higher score indicates children’s preference for 
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helpers over punishers in Study 4A. (D) Higher score indicates children’s preference for rational 
over irrational third parties in Study 4B. 
 
Table 2. Mean proportion of children who chose helpers over punishers (Study 4A) and those 
who chose rational over irrational third parties (Study 4B) in binomial tests collapsed across 
age. 
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Note.  The numbers in parentheses represent 95% confidence intervals.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Trait attribution. Children attributed relevant traits to the third parties: Children 
attributed generosity (73%; binomial test, p < .001) and empathy (68%; p = .002) to helpers, 
while they attributed aggression (73%; p < .001) and norm enforcement (65%; p < .01) to 
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punishers (see Table 2). These results suggest that children attributed warmth-related traits 
(generosity, empathy) to helpers and conflict-related traits (aggression, norm enforcement) to 
punishers, providing converging evidence with their preference for helpers over punishers.  
Discussion of Study 4A 
Study 4A showed that children evaluate both third parties positively and their ratings did 
not differ from each other significantly on the Likert scale. In forced-choice tasks, however, 
children preferred helpers over punishers. There were no age-related changes in either the Likert 
scale ratings or forced-choice social preference questions. Children inferred that helpers were 
more likely to show warmth-related traits (generosity, empathy), while punishers were more 
likely to show conflict-related traits (aggression, norm enforcement).  
However, there are at least two alternative explanations for children’s preference for 
helpers over punishers. One possible explanation is that children prefer helpers not because they 
reason about responses to unfair treatment but merely because they prefer givers over takers. 
They might have associated giving with positive evaluation and associated taking with negative 
evaluation. To address this alternative hypothesis, it is important to test if children like givers 
regardless of whether justice is restored or not. Another alternative account that could explain 
our previous results is that children might have preferred those who maximize resources. 
Concretely, in our setup, helping always resulted in more resources for the actors than 
punishment. For instance, helping resulted in 4:4 (8 candies in total), while punishment leads to 
2:2 (4 candies in total). Under this hypothesis, children do not care about rectifying inequality, 
but simply think that increasing rewards is generally better. Study 4B was designed to address 
these possibilities. 
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Study 4B: Do Children Merely Prefer Givers or Resource Maximizers Without 
Considering Fairness? 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 80 5- to 9-year-old children. One half of the 
children were assigned to the helping-only condition and the other half to the punishment-only 
condition. In the helping-only condition, our sample were n = 40 (M = 89.80 months, range = 60 
- 116 months, 8 participants in each age group, 20 female). In the punishment-only condition, 
our sample were n = 40 (M = 88.90 months, range = 60 - 119 months, 8 participants in each age 
group, 20 female). Children were drawn from the same population and tested in the same context 
as children from Study 4A. Twelve additional children were excluded either because they failed 
to identify the rational and irrational third parties during both memory check questions (4 in the 
helping only condition, 5 in the punishment only condition) because they did not endorse sharing 
(1 in the helping only condition), or there was an experimental error (1 in the helping only 
condition, 1 in the punishment only condition). 
Experimental design and procedure. The measures used in Study 4B were identical to 
those in Study 4A. To address the two possible alternative explanations described above, I tested 
children in two between-subject conditions. In the Helping-only condition, children’s preference 
for the rational helper was compared with that for the irrational helper. The irrational helper 
gives two candies to the unfair divider, while the rational helper gives two candies to the 
recipient. In the Punishment-only condition, the irrational punisher who takes two candies away 
from the recipient was compared with the rational punisher who takes two candies away from the 
unfair divider (see Table 1).  
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If children’s preference for helpers in Study 4A was due to their preference for givers to 
takers, I would expect no difference between irrational and rational helpers in the helping only 
condition. By contrast, if children in Study 4A made a judgment in terms of fairness, children in 
the current study would prefer rational over irrational helpers. Additionally, if children based 
their preference on those who maximize a total number of resources, there should be no 
difference in their preference between rational and irrational third parties as both rational and 
irrational third-party intervention result in the same amount of candies in each condition. By 
contrast, if those in Study 4A made a judgment in terms of fairness, they would prefer rational to 
irrational third parties in both conditions. 
Results 
Evaluations in Likert scale ratings. In the helping only condition, children’s evaluation 
of rational helpers (M = 2.08, SD = 1.59) differed significantly from neutral, one sample t-tests, 
t(39) = 8.25, p < .001, implying that they evaluated rational helpers positively. In contrast, the 
evaluation of irrational helpers (M = 0.60, SD = 2.05) did not differ from neutral; t(39) = 1.85, p 
> .07. In the punishment only condition, in which children were presented with rational and 
irrational punishers, their evaluation of the rational punisher (M = 2.10, SD = 1.28) differed 
significantly from neutral; t(39) = 10.4, p < .001. The ratings for the irrational punisher (M = 
0.70, SD = 1.98) differed from neutral; t(39) = 2.24, p = .03.  
I ran a full LMM on the Likert scale ratings with condition (helping only vs. punishment 
only), intervention type (rational vs. irrational), and age and interactions with the predictors as 
fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect. The results revealed that there were no 
interaction effects involving condition (all ps > .60). This shows that children’s evaluations of 
third-party actors were similar for the helping only and punishment only conditions. Critically, 
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there was a significant interaction between intervention type and age, LRT, χ2 (1) = 19.08, b = -
0.06, SE = 0.01, p < .001, indicating that children’s evaluations of rational vs. irrational actors 
changed with age (see Figure 14B).  
To unpack the interaction effect between intervention type and age, I ran separate LMMs 
for rational and irrational characters. I found that children’s evaluation of rational third parties 
did not change depending on their age, χ2 (1) < 1, p > .62. Whereas, children’s age significantly 
predicted their rating of irrational characters, χ2 (1) = 21.96, b = -0.06, SE = 0.01, p < .001, 
suggesting that children evaluated irrational third parties negatively as they grow older. 
To assess the age at which children’s rating of irrational third parties differs from that of 
rational ones, I computed the age point when confidence intervals no longer overlapped with 
each other. I found that around 82 months of age, children’s rating of irrational actors becomes 
lower than rational ones in both the helping only (rational M = 2.00, 95% CI [1.55, 2.45]; 
irrational M = 1.04, 95% CI [0.59, 1.49]) and punishment only conditions (rational M = 2.04, 
95% CI [1.60, 2.49]; irrational M = 1.08, 95% CI [0.63, 1.53]). These results suggest that 
children’s understanding of the justifiability of third-party interventions becomes robust by 7 
years of age. Therefore, the preference for helpers over punishers by children 7 years and older 
found in Study 4A cannot be explained by a mere preference for givers or for resource 
maximizers.  
Social preference in forced-choice questions. In the helping-only condition, children’s 
preference for rational helpers over irrational helpers increased with age from 50% in 5-year-olds 
to 88% in 9-year-olds when asked who they liked better. In friend and party questions, they 
showed a similar age-dependent increase in the preference (from 38% to 75% in the friend 
question and from 63% to 75% in the party question). In the punishment-only condition, similar 
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patterns were observed. Children’s preference for rational punishers over irrational punishers 
increased with age from 50% in 5-year-olds to 88% in 9-year-olds when asked who they liked 
better. The preference for rational punishers increased with age from 25% to 88% in the friend 
question and from 25% to 63% in the party question. 
Children’s responses to the three forced-choice questions (rational third-party = 1, 
irrational third-party = 0) were averaged into a social preference score because their responses in 
the three forced-choice questions (friend, party and like better) were highly intercorrelated 
(Cronbach’s α = .78). A higher score indicates a stronger preference for rational over irrational 
third parties. The results from a full GLM including condition (helping only vs. punishment 
only), age and the interaction between condition and age as fixed effects revealed that there was 
neither main effect nor interaction effect involving condition (all ps > .25). However, I found a 
significant effect of age on children’s social preference score, χ2 (1) = 9.06, b = 0.01, SE = 0.004, 
p < .01 (see Figure 14D). This suggests that with increasing age, children were more likely to 
prefer rational over irrational actors.  
To assess the age at which children’s preference for rational over irrational third parties 
becomes reliable, I computed the age point when confidence intervals no longer overlapped with 
the value of 1.5, which is the social preference score expected by chance. Results revealed that 
from 85 months of age, confidence intervals no longer overlapped with 1.5 (M = 1.79, 95% CI 
[1.502, 2.14]). This suggests that a preference for rational over irrational third parties becomes 
more reliable around age 7. Taken together, the findings from social preference scores as well as 
those from Likert scale ratings support that children gain a better understanding of proper targets 
of third-party interventions around 7 years of age. 
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Trait attribution. In the helping-only condition, children attributed empathy (80%; 
binomial test, p < .001) and generosity (75%; p < .01) to rational helpers than to irrational 
helpers. This suggests that even though both helpers showed the same giving behaviors, children 
infer warmth-related traits from rational helpers who restored recipients’ loss rather than from 
irrational ones who rewarded selfish dividers. Also, children in the helping only condition 
attributed aggression to irrational helpers (80%; p < .001). However, their attribution of norm 
enforcement was not significant (p > .26; see Table 2). It is perhaps not surprising that children 
had difficulties with attributing norm enforcement to one of the helpers because the focus of 
helping is to restore recipients’ loss, not to enforce norms on perpetrators. 
In the punishment-only condition, I predicted that children would attribute generosity, 
empathy and norm enforcement to rational punishers while attributing aggression to irrational 
punishers. However, this was not the case: there were no consistent attributions of traits to either 
kind of punisher (all ps > .08; see Table 2). One possibility is that the taking behavior that both 
punishers displayed might have made children perceive both punishers as an aggressive 
individual regardless of their rationality, preventing them from appreciating underlying 
personality traits of justifiable vs. unjustifiable punishment. These results in the punishment-only 
condition contrast with children’s successful trait attribution in the helping-only condition in 
which both helpers did not show taking behavior or Study 4A in which only one of two third 
parties showed taking behavior. 
Discussion of Study 4B 
Study 4B revealed that, from age 7, children like rational actors who decrease inequality 
more than irrational actors who increase inequality in both continuous Likert scale ratings and 
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forced-choice measures. This shows that by 7 years of age, children have a sophisticated 
understanding of justifiable third-party intervention.  
I note that there was no significant effect of condition for children’s rating of rational 
helpers and rational punishers. However, in contrast to Study 4A which aimed at directly 
comparing helpers and punishers, Study 4B with its focus on rational versus irrational 
intervention asked children to evaluate helpers and punishers as a between subject variable. As a 
consequence, children did not see helping and punishment side by side, which might explain why 
there was no significant difference in their evaluations of helpers and punishers– as long as 
helping and punishment reduced inequality.  
Results of Study 4B address outstanding questions from Study 4A by showing that 
children’s preference cannot be explained by a mere preference for givers over takers. This 
preference should have resulted in a non-significant difference in children’s liking between 
rational and irrational helpers. This alternative hypothesis is refuted by the current findings that 
children attended to whether helping decreased or increased inequality. This study also rules out 
that children preferred helpers to punishers because helping maximizes the total number of 
resources. This alternative account predicted that there should be no difference in preference 
between rational and irrational third parties. This is refuted by children preferring rational over 
irrational third parties in both the helping-only and the punishment-only conditions. Also, here, 
children attended to the impact of third-party’s action on fairness when evaluating them.  
However, one could argue that it is still unclear how children think about third-party 
interventions because Study 4A and 4B always asked children to evaluate third-party actors, not 
the act of intervention per se. Specifically, it is possible that children might evaluate actors and 
actions differently. One hypothesis is that children would evaluate punishing action as negative 
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or neutral. This result would suggest that, although children rate punishers positively, they do not 
view punishment as a preferable way to intervene against unfairness perhaps due to the observed 
aggression (i.e., taking behavior) in punishment.  
Alternatively, children would like punishing action more than helping action. That is, 
what children think is a proper way to intervene can differ from who they want to associate with. 
For example, even if they like helpers better than punishers as their friend, it is still possible they 
endorse punishment more than helping to uphold cooperative group norms and prevent future 
transgressions. 
The purpose of Study 4C was (1) to replicate children’s preference for helpers over 
punishers and (2) to examine whether children evaluate actions differently from the agents 
performing these actions or their evaluations of the actions correspond to their evaluation of the 
people performing them. 
Study 4C: How Do Children Evaluate Helping and Punishing Actions? 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 80 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 89.17 months, 
range = 59 - 118 months, n = 16 participants in each age group, 40 female). Children were 
recruited and tested at a museum in a Midwest town in the US. Demographic information such as 
race, education, and income were not asked. Ten additional children were excluded because they 
failed to identify the helper and punisher during both memory check questions (5), they did not 
endorse sharing (3) or there was interference from a parent or a friend (2).  
Experimental design and procedure. Children heard the identical story with a third-
party punisher and a helper as in Study 4A. The difference from Study 4A was that I included 
two new measures to examine children’s evaluations of each third-party’s action: (1) children’s 
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agreement with punishing and helping actions on the Likert scale, ranging from -3 (totally 
disagree) to +3 (totally agree) and (2) their forced-choice preference between the two actions 
(punishing vs. helping). In Study 4C, I excluded trait attribution measures and two of the three 
forced-choice questions used in Study 4A and 4B (i.e., friend, party) to focus our research 
question on evaluations of actions. However, I still kept our primary measures (i.e., Likert scale 
ratings about helpers and punishers and who they “like better” between the two actors) in Study 
4C to replicate children’s preference for helpers over punishers. 
After seeing the divider’s unfair allocation, children were asked to rate their agreement 
with helping and punishing actions on the 7-point smiley face Likert scale. For example, I asked 
“Some children say that [the third-party actor’s name] should take two candies away from [the 
unfair divider’s name]. What do you think about the idea?”. Subsequently, the same child was 
asked “Some children say that [the third-party actor’s name] should give two candies to [the 
recipient’s name]. What do you think about the idea?”.  
Furthermore, children were forced to choose what the third-party actor should do 
between punishment of the unfair divider and helping of the recipient (“What do you think [the 
third-party actor’s name] should do? Do you think he should take two candies away from [the 
unfair divider’s name] or give two candies to [the recipient’s name]?”). Importantly, children 
were asked to indicate their evaluations about punishing and helping actions before they heard 
about the actual intervention decision that the third-party actor made. 
I counterbalanced the order of the questions (ask punishing first vs. ask helping first), the 
order of agreement scale (agreement first vs. disagreement first) and the order of practice trials 
(practice positive statement first vs. practice negative statement first).  
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Results 
Evaluations in Likert scale ratings. In terms of third-party actors, children’s 
evaluations of helpers (M = 2.10, SD = 1.21) and punishers (M = 1.09, SD = 1.77) differed 
significantly from neutral (one sample t-tests, t(79) = 15.55, p < .001 and t(79) = 5.49, p < .001, 
respectively), suggesting that both the helper and punisher were rated positively. These results 
replicated the findings from Study 4A.  
In terms of third-party actions, children’s evaluations of helping (M = 0.86, SD = 1.95) 
differed significantly from neutral, suggesting that they viewed helping action positively, t(79) = 
3.95, p < .001, whereas punishment (M = -0.59, SD = 2.06) differed significantly from neutral in 
the opposite direction, suggesting that children viewed punishing action negatively; t(79) = -
2.55, p < .05. 
The results from a full LMM on the Likert scale ratings with the target (actor vs. action), 
intervention type (helping vs. punishment), age and interactions among the predictors as fixed 
effects and subject ID as a random effect revealed that there is a significant three-way interaction 
effect involving target, intervention type and age (LRT, χ2 (1) = 5.32, p < .05). To better 
understand the three-way interaction effect, I ran a separate LMM depending on the target (actor 




Figure 15. Likert scale ratings in Study 4C and 4D. 
(A) Likert scale ratings of helpers and punishers in Study 4C. (B) Likert scale ratings of helping 
and punishing actions in Study 4C. (C) Likert scale ratings of helpers, punishers and neutral third 
parties in Study 4D. (B) Likert scale ratings of helping and punishing actions in Study 4D. 
 
When it comes to actors, there was a significant main effect of intervention type (LRT, χ2 
(1) = 22.78, b = -1.01, SE = 0.20, p < .001), suggesting that children liked helpers more than 
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punishers (see Figure 15A). The findings show that children liked helpers more than punishers 
regardless of their age. 
In terms of children’s evaluations of actions, I found a significant interaction between 
intervention type and age (LRT, χ2 (1) = 5.54, p < .05; see Figure 15B). To unpack this two-way 
interaction, I ran separate linear models for helping action and punishing action. For evaluations 
of the act of helping, there was a non-significant effect of age, F(1, 78) < 1, p > .84, indicating 
that children rated helping positively regardless of their age. However, regarding the act of 
punishment, I found a significant effect of age, F(1, 78) = 9.68, b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, p < .01. That 
is, with increasing age, children tend to view punishing action more positively. Further 
inspections of confidence intervals revealed that from 102 months of age (8.5 years), the 
confidence interval of punishing action ratings started to overlap with that of helping action 
ratings (helping M = 0.83, 95% CI [0.36, 1.30]; punishment M = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.56, 0.39]). 
This finding tentatively suggests that a tendency to view punishment as a proper way to 
intervene against unfairness becomes reliable between ages 8 and 9 (but see our follow-up Study 
4D results for a discussion of the robustness of this effect).  
Social preference in forced-choice questions. When asked who they liked better, a 
majority (71%) of children chose helpers over punishers (binomial test, 95% CI [0.60, 0.81], p < 
.001), replicating the results from Study 4A. When asked to choose between two third-party 
actions, a majority (63%) of children chose the helping action over the punishing action 
(binomial test, 95% CI [0.51, 0.73], p < .05), reporting that the third-party actor should help the 
recipient rather than to punish the unfair divider. The results from a GLM indicated that children 
preferred helping over punishment irrespective of the target (actor vs. action) or their age.  
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Discussion of Study 4C 
In Study 4C, I replicated a preference for helpers over punishers in children. Both Likert-
scale and forced-choice measures suggest that children like third-party helpers better than 
punishers irrespective of their age.   
A new feature of Study 4C was that it assessed children’s evaluations about third-party 
actions. I found that 5- to 9-year-olds evaluated helping action positively regardless of their age. 
By contrast, children’s evaluation of punishing action became more positive between 8 and 9 
years of age. However, I did not find a similar age-related trend in the forced-choice question, in 
which children had to choose which action is a better way to intervene. Here, most children 
chose helping over punishing action regardless of their age.  
Overall, our findings suggest that across all age groups, children prefer helping over 
punishment. Even if children older than 8 start to view punishment more positively than younger 
children do, they still prefer helping over the punishing action when they must choose only one 
type of intervention. 
In Study 4A and 4C, a major finding was that children view punishers positively, but they 
do not prefer punishers as much as they prefer helpers. However, it is still unclear whether 
children genuinely like third-party punishers. One possibility is that children rated punishers 
positively because of their general positivity bias towards any human characters. In other words, 
children’s positive ratings of punishers might be inflated because of their mere liking of human 
characters in general, not because of the punishment the character performed.  
Study 4D was designed to address this possibility by introducing a neutral third-party. If 
children’s positive evaluations of punishers reflect their genuine liking, I would expect that 
children will like punishers more than the neutral third-party character. This result would suggest 
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that punishers gain additional reputational benefits by enacting punishment. Alternatively, if 
their positive evaluations of punishers are a mere positivity bias towards human characters 
irrespective of their actions, children should like the neutral third-party as much as the punisher. 
Such an outcome would suggest that punishers do not gain any additional reputations by enacting 
punishment. 
The purpose of Study 4D was to replicate Study 4C and to assess if punishers gain 
additional positive evaluations compared to neutral third parties.  
Study 4D: Do Children Evaluate Punishers More Positively Than Neutral Third Parties? 
Method 
Participants. Our final sample were N = 82 5- to 9-year-old children (M = 88.30 months, 
range = 60 – 118 months, n = 17 5-year-olds, n = 17 6-year-olds, n =17 7-year-olds, n = 17 8-
year-olds, n = 14 9-year-olds, 42 female). Children were drawn from the same population and 
tested in the same context as children from Study 4C. Five additional children were excluded 
because they failed to identify the third-party actors during both memory check questions. 
Experimental design and procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Study 4C 
except that children were introduced to a neutral third-party. At the beginning of the story, the 
experimenter said that the neutral third-party character is busy and cannot join the candy game 
that the other four characters—a divider, a recipient, a helper, and a punisher — are involved 
with. Then, the neutral third party left and did not appear during the rest of the story. That is, the 
neutral third party neither watched any of the events nor got involved in any way. The neutral 
third-party character was presented to children again along with the other four characters when 
the experimenter asked the test questions. Therefore, it appeared only twice during the entire 
testing session: At the beginning and the end (test phase) of the study.  
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All the measures were identical to those used in Study 4C except that I added (1) the 
Likert scale rating of the neutral third-party and (2) two additional forced-choice preference 
questions involving the neutral third-party (helper vs. neutral, punisher vs. neutral). 
Results 
Evaluations in Likert scale ratings. Children’s evaluations of helpers (M = 1.90, SD = 
1.60), punishers (M = 1.43, SD = 1.70) and neutral third parties (M = 1.09, SD = 1.62) differed 
significantly from the neutral value of zero (one sample t-tests, t(81) = 10.77, p < .001; t(81) = 
7.60, p < .001; t(81) = 6.07, p < .001, respectively), suggesting that all three third-party actors 
were viewed positively (see Figure 15C).  
The results from an LMM with age, intervention type and interactions with the predictors 
as fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect revealed that there was a significant effect of 
intervention type (LRT, χ2 (2) = 11.46, p < .01). The results indicated that children liked helpers 
more than punishers (b = -0.48, SE = 0.24, p < .05) and liked helpers more than neutral third 
parties (b = -0.82, SE = 0.24, p < .001). However, there was no difference in evaluations between 
punishers and neutral third parties (b = -0.34, SE = 0.24, p > .15).  
When it comes to actions, children’s evaluations of helping (M = 1.26, SD = 1.97) 
differed significantly from zero, suggesting that they viewed helping action positively (one 
sample t-test, t(81) = 5.76, p < .001). This result replicated the findings from Study 4C. By 
contrast, children’s ratings of punishment (M = -0.07, SD = 2.20) did not differ from zero, 
suggesting that children viewed the punishing action neutrally (one sample t-test, t(81) = -0.30, p 
> .76).  
Next, to test the effect of target (actor vs. action) on the ratings, I ran an LMM on the 
Likert scale ratings with the target (actor vs. action), intervention type (helping vs. punishment), 
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age and interactions with the predictors as fixed effects and subject ID as a random effect. There 
was a significant interaction between the target and intervention type (LRT, χ2 (1) = 4.99, p < 
.05; see Figure 15D).  
To unpack the two-way interaction between the target (actor vs. action) and intervention 
type (helping vs. punishment), I ran separate LMMs for the actor and action, respectively. 
Children liked helpers more than punishers (χ2 (1) = 4.61, b = -0.48, SE = 0.22, p < .05). Also, 
they liked helping action more than punishing action (χ2 (1) = 22.45, b = -1.33, SE = 0.26, p < 
.001). That is, regardless of target (actor vs. action), children liked helping more than 
punishment. The interaction effect between the target and intervention type was because 
children’s preference for helping over punishment is more pronounced in their ratings of actions 
than those of actors.  
Social preference in forced-choice questions. When asked who they liked better, 
children’s preference for helpers over neutral third parties increased with age (from 41% in 5-
year-olds to 100% in 9-year-olds). Similarly, the preference for punishers over neutral third 
parties increased from 29% to 86%, and the preference for helpers over punishers increased from 
35% to 93%.  
To examine the effect of age on children’s forced-choice preferences, I ran three separate 
GLMs on children’s choice in (1) helper vs. neutral third-party, (2) punisher vs. neutral third-
party, and (3) helper vs. punisher. First, the results from a GLM with a binary response term 
(helper = 1, neutral third-party = 0) indicated that age predicted children’s preference (LRT, χ2 
(1) = 11.04, b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, p < .001). That is, children are more likely to prefer helpers 
over neutral third parties as they grow older (see Figure 16A). Closer inspections of confidence 
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intervals revealed that confidence intervals no longer overlap with chance from 79 months (6.6 
years) (M = 0.64, 95% CI [0.51, 0.75]). 
 
 
Figure 16. Forced-choice social preferences in Study 4D. 
(A) Higher percentage indicates children’s preference for helpers over neutral third parties. (B) 
Higher percentage indicates children’s preference for punishers over neutral third parties. (C) 
Higher percentage indicates children’s preference for helpers over punishers. 
 
Second, the results from a GLM with a binary response term (punisher = 1, neutral third-
party = 0) revealed that age predicted children’s preference (LRT, χ2 (1) = 4.06, b = 0.03, SE = 
0.01, p < .05); Figure 16B), suggesting that children were more likely to prefer punishers over 
neutral third parties with age. Confidence intervals no longer overlap with chance from 96 
months (8 years) of age (M = 0.63, 95% CI [0.502, 0.73]). 
Third, the results from the GLM with a binary response term (helper = 1, punisher = 0) 
revealed that age significantly predicted children’s preference (LRT, χ2 (1) = 8.57, b = 0.04, SE = 
0.01, p < .01; Figure 16C), suggesting that their preference for helpers to punishers increased 
with their age. From 95 months of age (7.9 years), confidence intervals no longer included 
chance (M = 0.63, 95% CI [0.51, 0.74]).  
 97 
When asked to choose between two actions, most children (70%) chose helping over the 
punishing action (binomial test, 95% CI [0.58, 0.79], p < .001), replicating the findings from 
Study 4C. The results from a GLMM indicated that there was no effect of age on children’s 
choice between helping and punishing action, suggesting that children prefer helping over 
punishment regardless of age. 
Discussion of Study 4D 
Study 4D replicated the findings from Study 4C that children liked helpers more than 
punishers on the Likert scale ratings and that they preferred helping action over punishing action. 
However, unlike in Study 4C in which children rated punishment more positively with age, I did 
not find the same age effect in Study 4D. That is, regardless of their age, children rated 
punishment neutrally on the Likert scale. I conclude that the age effect found in Study 4C was 
not reliable enough because of the small sample size in each age group or the narrow age range.  
I found that children liked helpers more than neutral third parties. Interestingly, children’s 
ratings of punishers and neutral third parties did not differ significantly from each other, 
suggesting that punishers do not receive any additional positive evaluations from children 
compared to neutral third parties. In the forced-choice task, however, children’s tendency to 
prefer punishers over neutral third parties becomes stronger around age 8. These results suggest 
that the enactment of punishment does not entail additional reputational benefits in children 
younger than 8.  
In contrast to Study 4A and 4C, I did not replicate children’s preference for helpers over 
punishers in the forced-choice question. In Study 4D, children’s preference for both third parties 
did not differ significantly, and their preference for helpers to punishers becomes stronger around 
age 8. I speculate that young children might have had difficulties with comparing three pairs of 
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characters (Note that I found an age effect in all three forced-choice tasks; see Figure 16). The 
confusion might have been more pronounced in young children when they had to compare three 
different characters with each other in the forced-choice tasks than when they had to report their 
liking for one character at a time on the Likert scale in which I did not find an age effect. 
Discussion of Studies 4A-4D 
This series of studies provides new evidence on children’s evaluations of third-party 
interventions against fairness norm violations. This was possible, in part, because of our novel 
comparison between children’s evaluations of those who punish selfish resource dividers with 
those who help recipients of selfish resource allocations. I started with the recent evidence 
showing that adults generally view helpers more favorably compared to punishers (Jordan et al., 
2016; Patil et al., 2018; Raihani & Bshary, 2015a). For a first look at this phenomenon in 
children, I tested two competing hypotheses: One hypothesis assumed developmental continuity, 
proposing that this preference might be a deep-seated psychological phenomenon that is present 
already in children. The counterhypothesis conjectured that there would be a developmental 
discontinuity, with young children focusing more on superficial features of the actions, judging 
helpers as positive and the more aggressive punishers as negative, while older children 
acknowledge potential benefits of punishment and therefore evaluating punishers positively, and 
perhaps as positively as helpers.  
Overall, the current findings are consistent with the first hypothesis that children would 
share a similar preference with adults. Across studies, I found that children between 5 and 9 
years of age evaluated punishers positively. However, they liked helpers more than punishers. 
For example, children rated helpers more positively than punishers on the Likert scale (Study 4C 
and 4D). Similarly, they chose helpers over punishers in the forced-choice measures (Study 4A 
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and 4C). Furthermore, in Study 4A, I found that children inferred warmth-related traits 
(generosity, empathy) from helpers, while they inferred conflict-related traits (aggression, norm 
enforcement) from punishers, showing their reasoning behind the preference for helpers.  
I also ruled out two alternative hypotheses according to which children’s preference for 
helpers could be due to their preference for givers or for resource maximizers, respectively. 
Contrary to these alternative hypotheses, in Study 4B, I found that children aged 7 years and 
older liked rational third parties who decreased inequality more than irrational ones who 
increased inequality. This suggests that their preference for helpers can neither be explained by a 
mere preference for givers over takers nor by a preference for resource maximizers. In fact, from 
7 years on, children conceived of third-party interventions as aimed at identifying a proper target 
to reduce inequality rather than as indiscriminate giving or resource maximizing. 
Furthermore, I found that children’s preference for helping over punishment is not just 
limited to judgments of third-party actors. When I assessed children’s preference for the action 
per se, they liked helping actions more than punishing actions. Helping actions were always rated 
positively while punishing actions were rated negatively or neutrally (Study 4C and 4D). I found 
similar results in the forced-choice task: Children chose helping over punishment irrespective of 
their age (Study 4C and 4D).  
The current study contributes to the literature by moving beyond the focus on punishment 
alone and probing children’s thinking about punishment and helping side by side. Prior 
developmental research focused on comparing punishers with third parties such as onlookers 
who choose not to intervene after witnessing a transgression (e.g., Vaish et al., 2016) or givers 
who reward a transgressor (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2011), which might have led to inflating 
children’s preference for punishers. Instead, the current study compared punishment with 
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helping, a valid and common form of third-party intervention. Additionally, our study assessed 
children’s evaluations of punishment intervention per se and revealed a subtle but meaningful 
difference in understanding punishers vs. punishment, which was especially remarkable in young 
children. With the use of various measures and comparisons, the current study provided a more 
comprehensive understanding of the development of third-party punishment in children. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One potential concern is that the developmental pattern found in the current experiments 
is due to cognitive demands inherent in our tasks, rather than reflecting changes in fairness 
judgments per se. For example, younger children might have had difficulty keeping track of the 
identities and behaviors of each actor in our story. However, this is unlikely for two reasons. 
First, I included two memory checks, revealing that most children understood the events and 
identified actors in the story correctly (90% in Study 4A and 4B, 94% in Study 4C and 4D), 
while the few who failed both memory checks were excluded from our analyses. Second, our 
data do not support the idea that young children found the task too difficult. If young children 
had problems with understanding the story, they should have shown results different from those 
of older children across a wide range of measures. However, in the majority of our measures, I 
did not find significant age differences. For example, regardless of their age, children evaluated 
both helpers and punishers positively and preferred helpers over punishers. Additionally, there 
were no age differences in children’s ability to attribute relevant traits to a third-party (except for 
attribution of norm enforcement in Study 4A). Hence, it is unlikely that the task difficulty 
affected a few specific measures selectively. In summary, I believe that the age differences found 
in our measures reflect the development of children’s understanding of fairness and third-party 
interventions rather than the cognitive demands of our tasks. 
 101 
The current study elucidates the development of children’s evaluations of third-party 
punishment and helping in the context of fairness norm violations. One critical question to 
consider is why children and adults show this preference. A possible explanation is that people 
prefer those who show an empathetic concern for the well-being of others. People might consider 
helpers as someone who is trustworthy and dependable when in need, and thus want to associate 
with helpers rather than with punishers (Jordan et al., 2016; Patil, Dhaliwal, & Cushman, 2018). 
Another reason could be that helping is regarded as an empathetic and generous act, whereas 
punishment, even though justified, is regarded as aggressive. As a consequence, people may 
acknowledge that punishers are a necessary asset to uphold group norms but may be less likely to 
choose them as social partners due to the perceived aggression or dominance they display when 
enforcing norms (Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014). Another possibility is that children prefer 
those who establish equality and maximize resources simultaneously. One potential reason for 
children preferring helpers over punishers is that helpers not only establish equality but also 
maximize resources (enlarge the pie), whereas punishers establish equality but minimize 
available resources. Not surprisingly, adults seem to have a similar preference: they prefer an 
option that not only establishes equality but enlarge the pie at the same time over a punitive 
intervention (FeldmanHall et al., 2014; Heffner & FeldmanHall, 2019). Our study suggests that 
children do not merely like anyone who enlarges the pie (e.g., when helping increases 
inequality). However, it is still possible and indeed likely that children endorse resource 
maximization per se, as long as it does not increase inequality. Future research should investigate 
reasons underlying the preference for helping over punishment in children. 
Another critical question is whether children’s preference for helpers found in fairness 
norm violations in the current study can be generalized to other moral contexts. For example, in 
 102 
the context of physical harm, children might prefer punishment over helping because the 
physical harm inflicted on the victim might be considered as irrecoverable and thus not 
compensable. On the other hand, physical harm also often triggers an urge to comfort a victim or 
relieve pain, so children might regard punishment of perpetrators without a remedy for the victim 
as cruel. Similar arguments can be made about property damage or theft, opening many 
possibilities for future research across diverse moral domains.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
The goal of my dissertation was to investigate developmental trajectories and motivations 
underlying third-party punishment in children. The present work provides insight into three key 
issues: (1) when and how third-party punishment develops in children, (2) what motivates 
children to punish, and (3) how their evaluation of punishment compares to another form of 
intervention: third-party helping. Across a series of experiments, I have found that third-party 
punishment in children is driven by a concern for fairness. Concretely, when children can decide 
the degree of punishment, with increasing age, they fine-tune the exact amount of punishment 
needed to restore equality between two other people (Study 1). Similarly, as they grow older, 
children become more likely to pay a cost in order to stop the selfish divider from having all 
coins (Study 2). Findings from these two studies suggest that children are motivated not only to 
prevent inequality but also to actively create equality between individuals. Further, in Study 4 in 
which children heard about third-party interventions, with age, children prefer a third-party who 
decreased inequality over a third-party who increased inequality. Together, this provides 
converging evidence that over development, children think of third-party interventions as a way 
to reduce unfairness between two other people. 
Furthermore, results from Study 2 and 3 suggest that children’s third-party punishment is 
robust against self-focused factors. For example, their rate of third-party punishment was not 
easily affected by their personal experience of (un)fairness (Study 2) or the possibility of 
encountering the same social partner in the future (Study 3). Therefore, it seems that, in a certain 
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context, children do not use third-party punishment in a strategic manner to enhance or protect 
their personal interest. 
Although the studies described above demonstrated and highlighted the importance of 
third-party punishment in enforcing fairness norms, findings from Study 4 questioned the focus 
on punishment as a sole intervention against unfairness. To elaborate, Study 4 found that 
children assign positive evaluations to a third-party punisher, but they tend to prefer a third-party 
who compensated a disadvantaged recipient over a third-party punisher. These findings suggest 
that the role of punishment might have been overrated. Existing literature with adults and 
children focused exclusively on the role of punishment in cooperation. However, these studies 
presented punishment as the only way to intervene against a moral transgression without 
allowing an alternative intervention option (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; House et al., 2020; McAuliffe et al., 2015). Hence, Study 4 casts doubt on the degree to 
which punishment is endorsed in real life and calls for research on alternative interventions other 
than punishment.  
This dissertation investigated the development of third-party punishment and its 
underlying motives. The findings across the studies open up the possibility of three exciting 
future directions. First, more work is needed to better understand how children’s use of 
punishment compares to other types of third-party intervention. As mentioned above, it is 
possible that children in the current studies enacted costly punishment because it was the only 
option available to intervene in the situation. However, if children had had an alternative option 
(e.g., compensation or redistribution), they might have enacted punishment less often. Although 
the current studies primarily explored the development of monetary punishment, it is not the only 
way to enforce social norms. In fact, there are numerous other ways to respond to a moral 
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transgression in real life. These alternative interventions include tattling, reproaching verbally or 
forgiving. Future research should examine when and how children use these alternative 
interventions as a way to respond to a transgression. 
Second, future research should examine the extent to which children use third-party 
interventions strategically. In Study 3, I found that children do not use punishment differentially 
when they were told to interact with the same divider vs. a different divider, suggesting that they 
do not use punishment as a way to manipulate their future social partners. However, it is still 
unclear whether children’s lack of strategic interventions is limited to a punishment context or 
not. To elaborate, it is possible that children are not strategic only when they have to intervene 
by punishing, but they could still show strategic interventions when the context does not involve 
punishment. One way to address this question could be to examine if children use another 
behavior (e.g., rewarding of a fair allocation) strategically when they are told to interact with the 
same divider (vs. a different divider). By comparing children’s use of reward with their use of 
punishment, I would be able to determine whether children’s insensitivity to their future partner 
is limited to the punishment context specifically or whether the insensitivity could be generalized 
to another context as well. 
Lastly, future research should also investigate how children from different populations 
and cultures reason about and engage in third-party punishment. While I selected children from 
the US based upon prior studies, there are cross-cultural variations in fairness norms and 
behaviors across both adults and children (Blake et al., 2015; Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 
2008; Henrich et al., 2006; House et al., 2013). To be specific, most societies show punishment 
of selfish behaviors (Henrich et al., 2006; Hermann et al., 2008), showing that punishment of 
selfishness may be universal. Whereas, when it comes to punishment of cooperative behavior, 
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there are great variabilities across societies. Participants from collectivistic societies (e.g., 
Muscat, Athens) punish those who cooperated equally or more than themselves, leading to less 
cooperation in the group (Hermann et al., 2008). This suggests that punishment is not always 
directed towards antisocial behaviors. Instead, it could be used as a way to define social norms 
even if those antisocial norms could potentially undermine cooperation in the society. Therefore, 
it is a critical task for future research to assess similarities and differences in the developmental 
trajectory of fairness across different populations.  
As a part of this plan, I will examine how children’s evaluations about hyper-generous 
sharing (e.g., keeping 0 for the self and giving all resources to a partner) differs between US and 
Korea. One prediction is that children from Korea would punish hyper-generous sharing more 
often than those from US. Children from collectivistic culture could show more punishment 
towards hyper-generous sharing because most interactions in this culture could be limited to 
close-knit, ingroup-oriented relationships, and thus be suspicious of strangers who seem too 
generous without a clear reason (Hermann et al., 2008). I hope that this future research could 
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